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Previous studies indicate that the current Nutrition Facts Panel (NFP) on 
packaged foods and beverages may not efficiently provide nutritional 
information to consumers due to its high information search costs. In 
October 2007, the food and beverage industry announced the voluntary 
“Nutrition Key” front-of-package (FOP) system (later renamed as “Facts 
Up Front” and scheduled to be rolled out officially in 2014). My first 
chapter uses a market-level natural experiment to empirically evaluate 
how the voluntary Facts Up Front style FOP labeling system would 
affect consumer purchasing behavior and dietary choices, and whether 
the impacts are different across the population in the US Ready-to-Eat 
cereal (RTEC) market.  
In the second chapter, I further study the effects of the Facts Up Front 
style FOP labels by using a rich data set that combines households 
weekly purchases, product-level advertising exposure data and detailed 
cereal products' packaging and nutrition information. Starting with a 
market-level discrete choice demand model that allows for consumer 
heterogeneity and incorporates context effects, I develop an empirical 
framework for understanding the effects of different labeling schemes on 
consumers' food choices, market outcomes, manufacturers' product 
development, and firms' strategic adoption of FOP labels. 
In practice, consumers regularly make multiple purchases of different 
RTEC products in a shopping trip. In the third chapter, I examine the 
commonly neglected modeling assumption in the existing economic and 
marketing literature that only one product being purchased in a choice 
occasion. Existing literature also rarely touches upon the 
contemporaneous purchasing behavior and usually ignores the 
underlying correlations among chosen items, which may not be 
appropriated in studying markets for differentiated storable products such 
as cereals or carbonated soft drinks. I employ a Multivariate Bayesian 
approach to study such contemporaneous within-category purchasing 
behavior and investigate factors that determine the fundamental 
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Chapter 1
Heterogeneity in Consumer Responses to
Front-of-Package Nutrition Labels: Evidence
from a Natural Experiment
1.1 Introduction
Nutrition labeling has become of increasing public interest to policy
makers, consumers, and the food and beverage industry. In 1994, the
Nutrition Facts Panel (NFP) was added to the back or side of food
packages under the Nutritional Labeling and Education Act (NLEA),
to provide nutritional information of foods on a standardized label
and to promote healthier food choices. However, studies indicate that
NFP may not efficiently provide nutritional information to consumers
due to its high information search costs (e.g. hard to be read on su-
permarket shelves, lengthy back or side description, etc.), nor has it
had an impact on the obesity rate in the US (Drichoutis, Lazaridis and
Nayga 2005, Kiesel, McCluskey and Villas-Boas 2011). In October
2007, the food and beverage industry announced the voluntary “Nu-
trition Key” front-of-package (FOP) system (later renamed as “Fact-
s Up Front”), which displays summary nutrient-specific information
1
2for both “negative” (calories, sugar, sodium, and saturated fat) nutri-
ents and selected “positive” nutrients (fiber, calcium, protein, vitamin-
s, etc.).
The Facts Up Front style FOP nutrition labels have raised debate
between nutritionists and the food and beverage industry. Although
the industry states that it is the best to provide consumers with easier-
to-read complete nutrition profiles of both “bad” and “good” nutrients
of food products, opponents believe that adding “good” components
can be misleading or confusing, and make the overall FOP labels in-
efficient in helping consumers choose healthier alternatives (Nestle
and Ludwig 2010). This paper uses a market-level natural experiment
to empirically evaluate how these new Facts Up Front style FOP nu-
trition labels would affect consumer purchasing behaviors and their
dietary choices, and whether the impacts vary across the population.
Previous studies have focused on investigating consumers’ valu-
ation and usage to various labeling schemes using data from sur-
veys (Ippolito and Mathios 1990, Kim, Nayga and Capps 2000, Dri-
choutis, Lazaridis, Nayga, Kapsokefalou and Chryssochoidis 2008,
Todd and Variyam 2008, Kiesel et al. 2011), controlled laboratory
and field experiments (e.g. restaurants, supermarkets, etc.) (Keller,
Landry, Olson, Velliquette, Burton and Andrews 1997, Kozup, Crey-
er and Burton 2003, Berning, Chouinard, Manning, McCluskey and
Sprott 2010, Barreiro-Hurle´, Gracia and De-Magistris 2010, Kiesel
3and Villas-Boas 2010). However, only a limited number of studies e-
valuate consumers’ consequent changes in purchasing behaviors and
dietary choices that are more closely related to their health status.
Teisl, Bockstael and Levy (2001) analyze a nutritional labeling ex-
periment and find that consumer behavior is significantly altered, but
the changes are not necessarily leading to a consumption of healthier
products. Conversely, Mathios (2000) uses the pre- and post-NLEA
scanner data and find that the mandatory nutrition labeling has signif-
icant negative effects on sales of higher fat salad dressings.
In this study, I investigate consumer responses to the launch of
new Facts Up Front style FOP labels in 2007 using actual purchas-
ing data before and after the labeling intervention. This natural ex-
periment enables me to identify impacts of the new FOP nutrition-
al information changes on households’ consumption of Ready-to-Eat
cereal (RTEC) products through a differences-in-differences (DID)
approach. To address potential distributional effects, I employ the
quantile differences-in-differences approach and estimate the hetero-
geneous treatment effects across the distributions of cereal volume
consumed, intake of calories, sugar, sodium, and fiber from cereal
products, respectively. Using consumers’ purchasing data from real
store environments eliminates possible bias generated from survey re-
sponses and laboratory experiments. Taking advantage of the rich da-
ta set containing detailed product characteristics, nutrition and label-
4ing information, media exposure, and households’ socio-demographic
characteristics, I can control for a number of potentially confounding
factors and explore further on how individual characteristics may lead
to different responses in labeling change.
To the best of my knowledge, this paper is the first market-level
empirical study focused on the impacts of recently employed Facts
Up Front style nutrition labels. In particular, I address the following
questions: (1) whether the industry introduced nutrition labeling can
alter consumers’ food choices? (2) do effects differ across different
parts of the distribution? (3) how do individual characteristics affect
consumers’ purchasing decisions as well as labeling intervention re-
sponses? and (4) are the new labels confusing or misleading under
certain circumstances?
Following a differences-in-differences approach, I find substantial
evidence that the new Facts Up Front style FOP labels are generally
negatively associated with consumers’ cereal volume purchased, in-
take of calories, sugar, and sodium from cereal products. While quan-
tile differences-in-differences results show that the impacts mainly
work on the lower quantiles of the distribution only, or households
that purchase less than or equal to two cereal packages per month. It
is worth noting that the new Facts Up Front nutrition labels repeat the
NFP nutritional information in a new format, hence if consumers have
already incorporated the NFP information in their food choices, little
5impacts would be observed since no additional nutritional information
are provided (Teisl, Bockstael and Levy 2001, Kiesel et al. 2011). In
other words, consumers’ changes in purchasing behaviors in this study
can be primarily attributed to the reduced information search costs that
the new FOP labels offered.
Additionally, I find that household heads with high school degrees
or lower education levels benefit the most from the labeling interven-
tion, and present less calories, sugar, and sodium consumed from ce-
real products. On the other hand, the new FOP labels could be confus-
ing to this specific subgroup of households in terms of decreasing their
consumption of “good” nutrients (fiber) at the same time. The break-
fast cereal market also exhibits a successful “kidfluence” of children
between age 7 to 17 on their family purchasing decisions of foods.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 1.2 in-
troduces the model and empirical strategies. Section 1.3 describes the
data. The empirical results of mean impacts and distributional treat-
ment effects are presented in Section 1.4 with robustness verified. Sec-
tion 1.5 discusses what type of consumers are likely to be affected
more by the labeling intervention. Section 1.6 concludes.
61.2 Empirical Strategy
The natural experiment allows me to use a differences-in-differences
setup to explore whether the new FOP labels help consumers to make
healthier choices of cereal products. To further investigate the het-
erogeneous effects on households with different socio-demographic
characteristics, I implement the quantile differences-in-differences ap-
proach which allows the treatment effects to vary across the distribu-
tion.
I define the treatment and control conditions in two dimensions to
estimate the impacts of the new FOP label systems: (1) by time, and
(2) by households’ actual purchases of cereal products. First, because
both Kellogg’s and General Mills’ Facts Up Front style labels 1 were
launched in October 2007, I expect households have different cere-
al consumption pattern in the post-treatment period than in the pre-
treatment period if the new FOP nutrition labels effectively altered
consumers purchasing behaviors. Second, if a household bought a ce-
real product in a shopping trip that had either Kellogg’s or General
Mills’ new labels on the front of package, the household is considered
as “treated”. In contrast, households purchased cereal products that
did not have such multiple front-of-package nutrition labels are in the
control group.
1 Kellogg’s named it as “Nutrition at a Glance” and General Mills named it as “Nutrition High-
lights” back then.
7To control for the potential serial correlation of shocks that may
underestimate the standard errors of treatment effects in a DID set-
up, I transform the purchasing data into a pre-treatment and a post-
treatment period data (Bertrand, Duflo and Mullainathan 2000, Huang
and Yang 2012). Specifically, for each household, I calculate four
points: (1) the average pre-treatment monthly cereal consumption
from Kellogg’s/General Mills, and (2) from Post/Quaker; (3) the
average post-treatment monthly cereal consumption from Kellog-
g’s/General Mills, and (4) from Post/Quaker.
The standard differences-in-differences specification is based on
the following model:
yit = α0+α1dpost +α2dT + γ(dpost ×dT )+ τX+ εit , (1.1)
where yit denotes the average monthly cereal consumption 2 of house-
hold i in period t. dpost is a dummy variable that equals to 1 for the
post-treatment period in the data. dT is also a binary variable that e-
quals to 1 when household i consumes products from Kellogg’s and
General Mills. γ is the parameter of interest and the differences-in-
differences estimator. X is a vector of control variables, including both
marketing mix variables and household demographic variables. εit is
the disturbance term with mean zero and constant variance.
2 Measured by a number of different variables: volume of total cereal purchased, demand of calo-
ries, sugar, sodium, and fiber from cereal products.
8In covariates X , I have the average price and advertising exposure
as marketing mix variables. The product promotion variable is de-
fined as the percentage of a particular cereal brand that is under pro-
motion over all observed choice occasions. In terms of demographic
variables, I use average age of household heads, a high household in-
come indicator (equals to 1 if a household’s income is greater or equal
to $60,000 a year), male and female household heads’ educational at-
tainments, household size, and the presence of children among differ-
ent age groups (under age of 6, between 7 and 12, and between 13 and
17).
To allow for the effects of the treatment and covariates to flexi-
bly vary across the distribution of the dependent variable yi j, I follow
Koenker (2005) and estimate the model in equation (1.1) at each cho-
sen quantile. The pth conditional quantile of yit given dpost , dT , and X
is:
qp(yit |dpost ,dT ,X) = α0(p)+α1(p)dpost +α2(p)dT
+ γ(p)(dpost ×dT )+ τ(p)X+ εit(p). (1.2)
Notice that no additional distributional assumptions are made about
the error term εit . The quantile DID estimates can be obtained by min-
imizing the sum of the absolute residuals in equation (1.2).
91.3 Data
1.3.1 Data Description
For this analysis, I employ three proprietary data sets on household
purchases, product-level weekly advertising exposure, and package
information for the breakfast cereal category between January 2006 to
December 2008 3. The Nielsen Homescan data tracks the purchases of
breakfast cereal for a panel of 13,985 households across the 16 Des-
ignated Market Area (DMAs). These data include purchases made at
big box retailers, grocery stores, convenience stores, automatic vend-
ing machines and on-line retailers for at-home consumption. For each
purchase, I know time and location of the purchase, price and quantity,
and other product characteristics such as brand and package size. The
Nielsen Media Research data provide brand level TV advertising ex-
posure on a weekly basis for the same DMAs during the same weeks.
Advertising exposure is measured in gross rating points (GRPs). I al-
so obtain product package information from the Mintel Global New
Products Database (GNPD), which provides detailed product listings
since 1996 in 245 categories of food, drink, and other grocery store
items. Product listings are collected by Mintel based on product re-
3 Data and support are kindly provided by the Charles J. Zwick Center for Food and Resource
Policy at the University of Connecticut.
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formulations, new product introductions, new product packaging, and
new product varieties.
I focus on a panel of households who were relatively active buyers
of breakfast cereal products during the sample period, and the result-
ing dataset includes 3,977 households in 16 DMAs 4. Table 1.1 lists
product characteristics of 20 major cereal brands and the four biggest
4 manufacturers, Kellogg’s, General Mills, Post and Quaker.
1.3.2 Descriptive Statistics
To verify if there are systematic differences between the treatment
and control groups, Table 1.2 compares major household and product
characteristics for these two groups. Overall, major demographic and
marketing mix variables are substantively similar across the treatment
and control group, except that brands in the treatment group have ad-
vertising exposure twice as much as those in the control group. This
is not surprising considering that the treatment group include cere-
al products of Kellogg’s and General Mills, the nation’s two biggest
cereal manufacturers as well as advertisers.
Figure 1.1 plots households’ monthly cereal products volume pur-
chased of the treatment (Kellogg’s and General Mills) and control
4 “Active buyers” are defined as households who were observed to purchase cereal products at
least 10 times during a total of 152 weeks.
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(Post and Quaker) groups between November 2006 and September
2008. As this figure demonstrated, the treatment and comparison
groups are following very similar trends before the launch of the new
FOP systems in October 2007 (vertical dotted line), suggesting that
the control group may provide a suitable comparison for the treatment
group to study the effects of the new FOP labels on consumer choices.
Figure 1.2 displays a histogram of households’ average monthly ce-
real volume purchased in the sample, with kernel density estimate in
the solid blue line. The distribution shows a heavy right tail and strong
skewness. Although a majority of households consume about 10 to 50
ounces of cereal products at a monthly level, the long right tail indi-
cates that some households have a very high level of cereal demand.
These patterns indicate that the standard differences-in-differences
approach of the conditional mean regression, though appropriate to
model the mean treatment effect, may be incomplete to describe the
full distributional relationship between consumers’ heterogeneous ce-
real consumption and the treatment effect, as well as other covari-
ates. Hence, I use the quantile differences-in-differences approach to
capture a more comprehensive picture of how the new FOP label-
ing system affects different households across the whole distribution,
which is robust in handling “outliers” and reduces the importance of
functional-form assumptions (Meyer, Viscusi and Durbin 1995, Athey
and Imbens 2002).
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Figure 1.3 top panel shows the spread of households’ monthly ce-
real consumption estimated at quantiles between the 10th and 90th,
from November 2006 to September 2008. The bottom panel gives the
quantiles averaged over all months.
1.4 Estimation Results
I begin by discussing estimation results from the standard DID regres-
sion specification. I then compare the results with estimates from the
quantile DID specification where the treatment effect is allowed to
vary over the entire distribution of various dependent variables mea-
suring households’ consumption of cereal products.
1.4.1 Mean Impacts from the Standard DID Estimation
Table 1.3 presents standard DID estimation results controlled for ma-
jor demographic characteristics, marketing mix variables, and DMA
fixed effects. Standard errors are obtained from 200 bootstrap repli-
cations. The dependent variables from column 1 to 5 are household-
s’ average monthly (1) cereals volume purchased, (2) calorie demand
from cereals, (3) sugar demand from cereals, (4) sodium demand from
cereals, and (5) fiber demand from cereals, respectively.
13
The DID estimators of G*T show that launch of the new labeling
scheme is negatively related to households’ cereal products volume
purchased (column 1), calorie consumption (column 2), sugar con-
sumption (column 3), and sodium consumption (column 4) with sig-
nificance varies between1% and 5%.
The estimated price coefficients are negative and highly significant
in all specifications. On the contrary, advertising exposure of GRP has
significant positive effects across specifications. I do not find signifi-
cant impacts of percentage of products under promotion on consumer
purchase behavior.
Among all the social-demographic variables, household size, house-
holds with annual income of $60,000 and above, households with chil-
dren between 7 to 12 and 13 to 17, display general positive effects on
the dependent variables that are also statistically significant. House-
hold head’s age is positively related to cereal volume purchased, calo-
rie and sodium consumed from cereals, but not sugar consumed from
cereals, suggesting that younger households have higher incentives to
purchase cereals with more sugar. Interestingly, male household head-
s’ with college and graduate school degrees tend to buy more cereal
products, consume more calories, sodium, and fiber from cereals. A
more detailed examination of impacts on households with different
educational attainments is discussed in Section 1.5.
14
1.4.2 Robustness
To test the robustness of estimated mean impacts of the new FOP la-
beling, I include clustered standard errors at household level and indi-
vidual fixed effects to the benchmark regressions discussed in Section
1.4.1. Clustering by households allows non-zero correlation between
the errors for different observations of the same household, i.e. con-
trols for common household-level shocks. By further estimating with
individual (household) fixed effects, which is equivalent to difference
all variables from their means, all unobserved households’ differences
between treatment and control groups are removed. Results reported
in Appendix Table A1.1 and Table A1.2 show that the DID estimates
are robust in both circumstances.
1.4.3 Distributional Effects from the Quantile DID Estimation
The standard DID describes the treatment effect on the mean of the
dependent variable. However, in the case that the dependent variable
has an asymmetric heavy- or long-tailed distribution, the quantile re-
gression is more appropriate than the mean regression (Yu, Lu and
Stander 2003). From a policy maker’s prospective, it is essentially
important to examine whether there are different effects on differen-
t sections of the distribution. For example, do households with dif-
ferent levels of cereal consumption respond heterogeneously to the
15
implementation of new FOP labels? If so, given the right-skewed na-
ture of this dependent variable (as shown in Figure 1.2), the standard
DID estimation based conclusion and policy suggestions may over-
look specific population sections.
In this section, I conduct quantile DID regressions with respect to
a variety of dependent variables to explore potential distributional ef-
fects of the new FOP labels’ implementation. Results on consumers’
cereal products volume purchased, calorie consumption, sugar con-
sumption, sodium consumption, and fiber consumption from cereals
are reported in Table 1.4 through Table 1.8.
In particular, Table 1.4 give the quantile DID estimation result-
s at the 5th, 25th, 50th, 75th, and 95th percentiles of the distribution
of households’ monthly cereal volume purchased. From the results,
households with different levels of cereal demand indeed respond dif-
ferently to both the new FOP labels and various control variables. The
new FOP labels are still negatively and significantly associated with
household cereal demand, but only at the quantiles between 0.05 and
0.5 of the distribution. Figure 1.3.(2) demonstrates the quantiles of
the dependent variable measured in ounces. The 0.05 to 0.5 quantile
corresponds to households’ consumption of about 3 to 16 ounces of
cereal products per month, which is roughly equivalent to consuming
up to two cereal packages in a month. From column 3, the treatment
effect is the largest at the 0.5 quantile, or to households that buy about
16
two packages of cereal products per month. The implementation of
new FOP labels, however, have little impact on households that con-
sume cereal products at a relatively high level or excessively (column
4 and 5, representing the long right tail shown in Figure 1.2). Figure
1.4 graphically demonstrates the quantile DID effects (as in the solid
line) on consumers’ cereal volume purchased, where I use 200 boot-
strap replications to estimate the sampling distribution and construct
95% confidence intervals (as in dotted lines). For comparison purpos-
es, the mean DID effect is plotted as a horizontal dashed line.
All price coefficients are negative and significant, while price sen-
sitivity increases substantially from the lower quantile to the higher
quantile of the distribution. Effects of advertising exposure have in-
creasing positive influences on consumers from the lower quantile to
the higher quantile, too. The implication here is that households’ with
high cereal demand are more price sensitive, and influenced more by
advertising.
With regard to the demographic variables, there are clear positive
and increasing impacts of the average household head age and house-
hold size on cereal consumption through most of percentiles. The p-
resence of children under age of 6 rarely affect households’ cereal de-
mand, however, the presence of children between age 13 to 17 show
a statistically significant and increasing positive effect. More discus-
sions about demographic issues are in Section 1.5.
17
Table 1.5, 1.6, 1.7, and 1.8 report similar quantile DID regression
results on households’ calorie consumption, sugar consumption, sodi-
um consumption, and fiber consumption from cereal products, respec-
tively. The new FOP labels appear effective through all quantiles of
the distribution only in the case of reducing sugar intake, as displayed
in Table 1.6. For intake of calories and sodium, the new FOP labels
only negatively affect households under the 0.5 quantile of the distri-
bution that are similar with the case of total volume demand, as shown
in Table 1.5 and Table 1.7. There is no observed significant effects on
consumers’ fiber intake across the distribution.
1.5 What Types of Consumers Are Affected More?
1.5.1 Education
Previous studies have found positive relationships between education
and label usage from survey data (Kim, Nayga and Capps 2001, Dri-
choutis et al. 2005). This does not necessarily mean that implementa-
tion of new FOP nutritional labels would affect higher-educated con-
sumers more and lead to bigger buying behavior changes in real store
environments. To further explore how consumers with different ed-
ucational attainments respond to the Facts Up Front style FOP label
changes, I evaluate treatment effects in different subgroups of the full
sample.
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Table 1.9 gives estimation results of education subgroups, where
individual (household) fixed effects are included in the estimation,
and only DID estimates from regressions of each Subgroup × De-
pendent Variable combination (30 regressions in total) are displayed.
Surprisingly, female household heads with high school degrees and
below show biggest influences from the new FOP labels, where cere-
al volume purchased, calories, sugar, sodium, and fiber consumption
obtained from cereal products all associated with negative and signif-
icant impacts. The fiber consumption of female household heads with
college degrees dose not experience significant changes. On the con-
trary, female household heads with graduate school degrees, or the
highest educational level, are not significantly influenced in any case.
The ineffectiveness to female households with higher educational
attainment can be explained by that female consumers who went to
graduate schools are already familiar with the nutritional information
provided by the new FOP labels, hence less likely to change their food
choices from previous experiences. Notice that the Nutrition Facts
Panel (NFP) is available on the side or back of all the food products
since 1994 5, which already contains all nutritional information that
Facts Up Front labels have. In a previous study, Blitstein and Evan-
s (2006) have shown that only 53% of consumers claim to use NFP
5 NFP lists detailed nutritional information of total calories, calories from fat, total fat, saturated
fat, cholesterol, sodium, total carbohydrate, dietary fiber, sugars, protein, etc, in both quantitative
amount per serving and percent of the Daily Value (DV) (Kulakow, Baggett and McNeal 1993).
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when purchasing food products, where females and more educated in-
dividuals are more likely to use NFP labels (Kiesel et al. 2011). My
results highlight the fact that although the new FOP labeling scheme
does not affect female households with graduate school degrees much,
it effectively helps other female consumers understand and process
the nutritional information better, leads to significant decrease in con-
sumption of calories, sugar, and sodium from cereal products, espe-
cially to female households with high school degrees and below. The
implied reduction in consumer’s cost of processing nutritional infor-
mation may due to the format used to present the new Facts Up Front
style FOP labels, which are considerably easier to access and under-
stand compared with NFPs.
For subgroups of male households, impacts are similar to those of
female households in general. Except that male households with col-
lege degrees exhibit less influences from the launch of new FOP la-
bels.
Additionally, the consumption of fiber, which is regarded as a
“good” nutrient, is negatively impacted only in the subgroups of
households with high school degrees and below (Subgroup 1 and 4),
suggesting that new FOP labels may be confusing to less-educated
consumers in terms of distinguishing “good” nutrients away from
“bad” nutrients that need to be avoided.
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1.5.2 “Kidfluence”
Behavioral studies and marketing research have documented that chil-
dren can play an important role in influencing their parents and af-
fect family food choices, known as the “kidfluence” (McDonald and
Lavelle 2001, Dhar and Baylis 2011,Williams and Page 2011), where-
as so far there is little empirical evidence from market level studies
or households’ actual shopping behavior. On the other hand, little is
known about how households with children may respond differently
to food nutrition labels. In this section, I provide empirical evidence
that the presence of children at different age groups can affect house-
holds’ dietary choices, as well as responses to the new FOP labels.
The mean DID effects reported in Table 1.3 have shown that the
presence of children among two age groups, age 7 to 12 and age 13
to 17, significantly raises households’ consumption of cereal products
measured in volumes, calories, sugar, and sodium. The coefficients of
effects of children between age 13 and 17, Kids 13 to 17, are estimated
approximately twice as much as that of children between age 7 to
12, suggesting that older teenage children may have an even greater
influence on their family food purchasing decisions.
From quantile DID results reported in Table 1.4 through Table 1.8,
children at age between 13 to 17 are positively associated with higher
household cereal volume purchased, calorie, sugar, and sodium con-
sumption, almost at all percentiles of the distribution. While children
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at age between 7 to 12 mostly affect only the lowest and highest quan-
tiles.
On the other hand, children under age of 6 seldom have an im-
pact on household cereal consumption, or relate to a negative effect
in some cases. This may because that little kids have little influence
on their parents’ purchasing decisions, or simply due to less food they
required as a household member.
To investigate whether households with children belonging to dif-
ferent age groups respond to the new FOP labels differently, I eval-
uate the treatment effect in each subgroup according to households’
children status. The DID estimates are reported in Table 1.10, where
individual fixed effects are included in the estimation to remove any
other observed or unobserved demographic heterogeneity. Interesting-
ly, households with children between age 7 to 12 and 13 to 17 exhibit
significant negative treatment effects after the launch of new FOP la-
bels, compared with little responses in subgroups of households with
children under age of 6 or without children under age of 17.
This can be partly explained by potential different overweight/obesity
concerns across households of different subgroups. In a recent report,
26.7% of children between 2 to 5 are considered to be overweight
or obese in 2009, while for children and teens between 6 and 19, the
overweight/obesity rate rises to 33.1% (WIN 2012). Hence, to curb the
higher rate of overweight and obesity, families with children between
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age 7 to 17 may have a special interest in diet, and a higher incentive
to search for nutrition information and use nutrition labels (Drichoutis
et al. 2005), either by parents or older children themselves.
1.6 Conclusion
In this paper, I analyze whether the implementation of Facts Up Front
style FOP labels since October 2007 affect consumers’ purchase de-
cisions of breakfast cereals. By using a rich data set from a market-
level natural experiment, I am able to estimate the mean labeling im-
pacts on consumers’ actual purchasing behavior in real store environ-
ments, as well as distributional effects across the population. Based on
the differences-in-differences and quantile differences-in-differences
approaches, the new FOP labels show strong negative relationship-
s with consumers’ cereal volume purchased, intake of calories, sug-
ar, and sodium from cereal products, but the impacts mainly work on
households that purchase less than or equal to two cereal packages per
month only. Consumers with greater cereal demand (on higher quan-
tiles of the distribution) are more price sensitive, and are less likely to
be influenced by the new nutrition information labeling scheme. Since
the nutrition information are already available on Nutrition Facts Pan-
els long ago, consumers’ changes in food choices can be principally
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attributed to the reduced information costs provided by the new FOP
labels 6.
I further investigate how individual characteristics may determine
labeling impacts and consumers’ food choices, by taking advantage
of the detailed demographic characteristics combining with house-
hold scanner data. In general, household size, household head age,
and income are positively associated with the consumption of cereal
products. The presence of children between age 7 to 12 and 13 to 17
significantly makes their family to consume more cereal products, in-
dicating a successful “kidfluence” in the breakfast cereal market. With
Regards to the labeling effects of different subgroups, the largest ef-
fect is found among consumers with high school degrees or below. As
a result, the new FOP labels are the most successful in terms of help-
ing less-educated consumers interpret nutritional information, make
healthier dietary choices, and consume less calories, sugar, and sodi-
um. It is worth noting that, however, household heads with high school
degrees or below also exhibit a tendency to consume less fiber after
the new labels’ launch. This implies that the specific format of Facts
Up Front labels, which combines “unwanted” and “wanted” nutrients
6 Kiesel et al. (2011) show that NFP does not provide nutritional information effectively.
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together 7, can be confusing to consumers with lower educational at-
tainment.
This empirical large-scale panel study adds market-based evidence
to the existing literature, on how Facts Up Front style front-of-package
nutrition labels can reduce information costs, affect purchasing behav-
iors, and benefit particular consumers in the real store environment.
It also highlights the possibility that standard conditional mean re-
gressions may overlook effects on certain parts of the distribution, in
which a quantile regression can be more appropriate to examine d-
ifferent distributional labeling impacts. Future research on a variety
of food categories may be beneficial to explore potential different re-
sponses of consumers to FOP nutrition labels, such as food products
that contain a larger taste-nutrition trade-off.
7 “Unwanted” nutrients include calories, sugar, sodium, and saturated fat; “wanted” nutrients in-
clude fiber, potassium, protein, vitamin A, vitamin C, vitamin D, calcium and iron.
Chapter 2
Consumer and Producer Responses to
Front-of-Package Nutrition Labeling
2.1 Introduction
Growing concerns on widespread obesity and other diet-related dis-
eases have prompted efforts on getting consumers to eat healthier. Nu-
tritional labeling is a particularly attractive policy instrument because
it informs consumers at the point of purchase without being intrusive.
The Nutritional Labeling and Education Act (NLEA) in 1994 mandat-
ed disclosure of nutritional characteristics for most packaged foods in
a standardized form of Nutritional Facts Panel (NFP). There has been
a proliferation in recent years in nutritional labeling placed on the
front-of-package (FOP), in addition to the back or side-of-package
NFP. As FOP nutritional labels are more visible and easier-to-read
than the NFP, they have the potential for helping consumers to make
informed choices. In addition, it is believed that one of the greatest po-
tential public health benefits of FOP nutritional labeling is to motivate
the food industry to develop healthier products and/or reformulate ex-
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isting products. Golan et al. (2009) suggest that nutritional labeling
policies may incite product development and reformulation as the pro-
ducers strive to appeal to health-conscious consumers, which in turn
can improve diet nutritional quality of all consumers including the less
health-conscious ones 1. At the same time, there has also been increas-
ing concern that unregulated FOP nutritional labels could confuse or
mislead consumers (Glanz, Hersey, Cates, Muth, Creel, Nicholls, Ful-
goni III and Zaripheh 2012, Hawley, Roberto, Bragg, Liu, Schwartz
and Brownell 2012).
In response, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) has under-
taken a FOP labeling initiative that calls for cooperative efforts be-
tween the government and the food industry in developing a practi-
cal, science-based FOP regime (FDA 2010). The White House Task
Force on Childhood Obesity concurred (WHTFCO 2010). Congress
charged the Institute of Medicine (IOM) to examine the issue. IOM
reviewed the existing FOP systems and recommended in a subse-
quent 2011 report a standardized government-sponsored FOP sym-
bol system focusing on four “negative” nutrients to limit (e.g., sugar)
(Wartella, Lichtenstein, Boon et al. 2010, Wartella, Lichtenstein, Yak-
tine, Nathan et al. 2011). The food and beverage industry, opposed
IOM’s recommendation and announced its own voluntary “Nutrition
1 Jin and Leslie (2003) have demonstrated that additional information disclosures of restaurant
hygiene grade cards can significantly improve the product quality.
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Key” FOP system (later renamed as “Facts Up Front”), just prior to the
IOM’s recommendations (GMA 2011a, GMA 2011b). Facts Up Front
participants would display summary nutrient-specific information for
both “negative” nutrients and selected “positive” nutrients (e.g., calci-
um).
As the government and the industry are still heatedly debating
on FOP, it is critical to understand consumers’ and producers’ re-
sponses to different FOP schemes. A number of papers (Grunert and
Wills 2007, Glanz et al. 2012, Hawley et al. 2012) surveyed the exist-
ing research on FOP nutritional labels. Although there is a growing lit-
erature on how consumers perceive and use FOP symbols, most of the
studies are based on stated preferences and controlled experiments,
and only limited research deals with consumer choices in a real-world
setting. Even little research has investigated manufacturers’ responses
to FOP nutritional labels.
In sum, the existing research offers few insights into the following
high-stake questions: How do FOP nutritional labels affect consumer
choices in actual shopping occasions? Will food manufacturers volun-
tarily adopt FOP nutritional labels? What are the effects of FOP nutri-
tional labeling on product development and reformulation? This study
attempts to shed light on these issues. Particularly, I develop an empir-
ical framework for understanding the effects of different FOP schemes
on consumers’ food choices, market outcomes, manufacturers’ prod-
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uct development and/or reformulation, and manufacturers’ strategic
adoption of FOP schemes. Policy makers can use this framework to
assess the policy feasibilities and public health benefits of different
FOP regimes, and the manufacturers can use it to aid its managerial
decision making regarding FOP labels.
I start with a market-level discrete choice demand model that al-
lows for consumer heterogeneity (Berry, Levinsohn and Pakes 1995,
Nevo 2000b) (henceforth BLP). As is standard in the literature, a
consumer in my model derives utility from a product’s attributes
including product price, advertising and nutritional characteristic-
s. I further incorporate context effects into the model. Context ef-
fects imply that a consumer’s choice is influenced by the contex-
t provided by other alternatives in the choice set she faces. There is
ample documented evidence from psychology and behavioral litera-
ture that context effects are important drivers of consumer behavior
(Chakravarti and Lynch Jr 1983, Payne 1982, Prelec, Wernerfelt and
Zettelmeyer 1997, Ratneshwar, Shocker and Stewart 1987). Incorpo-
rating context effects generates more realistic predictions of consumer
choices, and thus has important managerial and policy implications.
FOP nutritional labeling may impact consumer choices in the follow-
ing ways in my demand model. First, it could affect consumers’ utili-
ty derived directly from certain nutrients by increasing the salience of
these nutrients. Second, FOP labels may also affect consumers’ choic-
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es by moderating the relative standing of a product in the choice set
or context effects.
I apply the model to the US ready-to-eat (RTE) breakfast cereal
market. Ready-to-eat cereals is a staple of American diet. It is the
largest packaged food category that is directly marketed to children.
The nutrition quality of most of the children’s cereals however is poor.
Therefore, FOP nutritional labeling in this market could potentially
have deep impact from a public health perspective. I combine house-
hold purchase scanner data between 2006 and 2008 with detailed on-
package information. In late 2007, Kellogg’s and General Mills, the
two leading companies in this market, individually adopted FOP nu-
tritional labeling systems that summarize the amount of selected nutri-
ents and their respective Guideline Daily Amounts (GDA). This event
allows me to identify the effects of FOP nutritional labeling on con-
sumer choices.
With the demand estimates, I turn to the supply side. I investigate
the firms’ equilibrium strategies of voluntary adoption and product
development under various hypothetical FOP schemes, such as “good
news only” and “bad nutrients only”. For each given FOP scheme, I
solve for the profit-maximizing pricing strategy, as well as the equilib-
rium voluntary FOP adoption strategy for each firm in a simultaneous
or a sequential game. Finally, I study a firm’s optimal new product
strategy under different FOP schemes, taking into account of the con-
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text effects. In turn, I examine consumer choices and public health
implications resulting from firms’ equilibrium strategies.
My empirical investigation finds that nutrient-specific FOP labels
have significant influence over consumer choices in the real world. In
another word, FOP labels can be an effective way to discourage con-
sumers to limit negative nutrient intake and/or encourage them to in-
crease positive nutrient intake. I also find that, left unregulated, profit-
maximizing firms prefer “good news only” FOP label schemes, result-
ing in high levels of consumption of negative nutrients by consumers.
But a FOP scheme that requires disclosure of negative nutrients but
allows for that of positive nutrients could be politically viable and
leads to “second-best” public health outcomes. Additionally, I present
interesting results on new product development under various FOP
regimes when context effects are accounted for.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. I will complete
the introduction with a discussion of some related literature. Then I
turn to the empirical avenue: the US RTE market and the data used
in the study. Next, I specify the model and discuss identification and
estimation methods. Finally I present my results from the demand side
and the supply side before I conclude.
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2.1.1 Related Literature
There has been an emerging literature on consumers response to FOP
nutritional labels, as FOP nutritional labeling has become a hot topic
worldwide in recent years. A lot of this literature concerns the cog-
nitive mechanisms through which consumers process, perceive, and
prefer different types of FOP symbols and labels, and how consumer-
s from different subpopulations are likely to use FOP symbols when
shopping for foods. The primary methodology used includes labora-
tory experiments and consumer surveys. For instance, Borgmeier and
Westenhoefer (2009) use randomized choice experiments to examine
how different FOP label formats affect food purchase and consump-
tion. Whereas this type of research is very instrumental in guiding the
design of a user-friendly FOP system, it could be low in external va-
lidity because it abstracts away many other confounding factors when
consumers make their food choices in there real world. Only a handful
studies use real-world data to gauge consumer responses to FOP la-
bels and shelf nutritional labels in a realistic setting with inconclusive
results. Sacks, Rayner and Swinburn (2009) use sales data of two food
categories from a major U.K. retailer in the four weeks before and af-
ter the introduction of Traffic Light (TL) FOP labels in 2007. TL is a
color-coded system of FOP labels recommended by the U.K. Food S-
tandards Agency (FSA) indicating the level of fat, saturated fat, sugar
and salt. A red, amber, or green light indicates a high, medium, or low
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level of a nutrient, according to FSA’s nutrition criteria. They did not
find any significant sales change in the sandwich category. Although
they find a slight increase in the sales of ready meal category after the
TL introduction, they conclude that there was no connection between
the change in sales and the healthiness of the products. Schucker et
al. (1992) evaluate a shelf-tag program that identifies products low in
sodium, fat and cholesterol, and find significant increases in sales in
many categories of tagged products. Sutherland, Kaley and Fischer
(2010) use purchasing data of RTE cereals from 2006-2008 from a
U.S. supermarket chain. In September 2006, the chain adopted a shelf
nutritional tag system called “Guiding Star”, which displays zero, one,
and two stars to indicate the nutritional quality of a product based on
weighted scores for trans fat, saturated fat, cholesterol, sodium, added
sugars, and positive nutrients including vitamins and minerals, fiber,
and whole grains. They find that the implementation of the system
has significant immediate and long-term effects on consumers food
purchases. In contrast, Freedman and Connors (2011) collected sales
data from a field experiment that combines nutritional shelf tags as
well as nutritional education conducted in a campus convenience s-
tore, and did not find any significant impacts of the intervention on
sales. This current research is, to the best of my knowledge, the first
study that uses actual purchase data to examine American consumers’
response to FOP labels. Using a structural demand model, my empir-
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ical approach is distinct. The structural approach has the advantage
of enabling counterfactual simulations on the effects of different FOP
regimes on realistic consumer choices.
This study also contributes to a limited body of literature on how
food producers respond to various FOP nutrition labels. This lit-
erature deals with producers’ implementation, product developmen-
t/reformulation, and market sales. This area of research has important
policy implications. Young and Swinburn (2002) evaluate the effects
of New Zealand National Heart Foundation’s Pick the Tick program
on product reformulation. Food manufacturers are able to display the
Pick the Tick logo on FOP if their products meet certain nutrition
criteria. Using data on sales and reformulation, they find that the pro-
gram led to a 61% average sodium reduction in the breakfast cereal,
followed by a reduction of 26% and 11% in bread and margarine cat-
egory respectively in a one-year period after the program. Two other
studies (Williams, McMahon and Boustead 2003, Cobiac, Vos and
Veerman 2010) also document that a similar program in Australia is
effective in reducing sodium content. Van Camp, Hooker and Souza-
Monteiro (2010) use Mintel Global New Product Database to exam-
ine FOP voluntary adoptions of all U.K. food releases in 2002-2008.
They observe selective FOP adoptions across companies and cate-
gories, and find that Guideline Daily Allowance (GDA) FOP system is
more widely adopted than the traffic light labeling system (TLS). Vyth
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et al. (2010) survey 47 manufacturers in Netherlands to investigate
whether joining a FOP logo program “Choice” has motivated them to
make healthier products. They find that manufacturers respond to the
program by developing and reformulating their products to carry the
logo. All the existing studies evaluate the producer responses from
some implemented FOP symbols. I add to the literature by investi-
gating the sales responses from two implemented FOP systems in the
United States. More importantly, I enrich this literature by providing a
framework to analyze manufacturer responses to FOP, including vol-
untary adoption of different FOP regimes, and product development
and reformulation decisions.
I study firms’ strategic decisions of participating in a voluntary
FOP initiative. Therefore, this study is related to the literature on
voluntary regulation participation. There has been a number of the-
oretical literature that consider whether participating in a voluntary
pollution-abating initiative can be an equilibrium firm strategy (Brau
and Carraro 2011, Dawson and Segerson 2008). The only empiri-
cal exception is Cohen and Huang (2012) who develop a dynamic
oligopoly model of participation, calibrated with children’s RTE cere-
als also, in a voluntary marketing initiative where participants com-
mit to advertising only products that meet certain nutritional stan-
dards. My study focuses on FOP initiatives which involves disclosure
of information but not marketing restrictions. My framework can be
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adapted to analyze voluntary programs of disclosing important prod-
uct characteristics to consumers.
I specify a demand model that incorporates context effects. There-
fore this study is related to the large body of literature on contex-
t effects in general, and studies that account for context effects in
empirical choice models in particular (Huber, Payne and Puto 1982,
Lehmann and Pan 1994, Geyskens, Gielens and Gijsbrechts 2010). I
closely follow Rooderkerk, Van Heerde and Bijmolt (2011) in con-
structing and incorporating context variables. They have shown that
accounting for context effects produces better predictions of consumer
choices in and out of sample.
2.2 Industry Background and Data Description
My empirical venue is the US Ready-to-Eat cereal market, where Kel-
logg’s, General Mill’s, Quaker and Post, together account for more
than 75% of sales in the US market between 2006 and 2008 (Fig-
ure 2.1). Children’s RTE cereals score low in nutrition quality. Reedy
and Krebs-Smith (2010) identify children’s cereals as a top source
of added sugar in children’s diet in the US. Using 2008 data, Har-
ris, Schwartz and Brownell (2009a) reports that cereals marketed to
children have 85% more sugar, 65% less fiber, and 60% more sodium
than adults cereals. Therefore, FOP nutrition labels in this market may
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bring important public health benefits, given its potential of helping
busy parents to make smarter choices and encouraging manufacturers
to develop better products.
The major data used for demand estimation consists of household
purchase records from Nielsen2, and detailed product packaging and
nutrition information from the Mintel Global New Products Database
(GNPD). The weekly purchase data covers seven main Designated
Market Areas (DMAs) of New York, Boston, Detroit, Washington D-
C, Atlanta, San Francisco, and Seattle between January of 2006 and
December of 2008.
For each purchase, I have time and location of the transaction,
price paid, quantity, and key demographic variables of the household
that made the purchase. I also have product-level television advertis-
ing exposure data on a weekly basis for each DMA. The advertising
exposure is recorded in gross rating points (GRPs), which measures
the size of an audience reached by a specific cereal advertising cam-
paign3. In this study, different package sizes of a brand are treated as
the same product, and all marketing mix variables are aggregated at
brand/DMA/biweekly level to accommodate with the demand model.
2 Including purchases made by 13,985 households at big box retailers, grocery stores, convenience
stores, automatic vending machines, and on-line retailers for at-home consumption.
3 GRPs = frequency × % of target audience reached.
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The product characteristics that are assumed to influence consumer
tastes include per ounce numerical contents of calories, sugar, satu-
rated fat, sodium, and fiber of cereal products. These variables are
then used to construct context variables of compromise and similarity
described in the next section. From the Mintel dataset, I am able to
define a set of dummy variables that indicate the presence of differ-
ent nutrition labels on front of cereal packages. Specifically, I have
labels of calories, sugar, saturated fat, and fiber that exhibit variation
throughout the data period examined.
In October 2007, Kellogg’s started to display a monochrome FOP
labeling system called “Nutrition at a Glance” based on the European
Guideline Daily Amounts (GDA) system on the top-right corner of its
cereal packages. Nutrition at a Glance presents the total amount per
serving of four key nutrients: calories, saturated fat, sodium, and sug-
ar, along with a percentage of the recommended daily intake values. In
addition, Kellogg’s can opt to display up to two “nutrients to encour-
age”, such as vitamins and fiber. About the same time, General Mills
also started to use a very similar Nutrition Highlights FOP regime.
For both companies, the new FOP nutrition labels replace their orig-
inal FOP symbols and claims which are often vague and qualitative
(e.g., “good source of fiber”), without information on actual amoun-
t or percentage of recommended daily intake. Figure 2.2 and Figure
2.3 show examples of the front package and FOP symbols before and
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after the voluntary adoption of GDA type FOP systems for both com-
panies. The two companies with smaller market share in the market,
Quaker and Post, did not change their FOP formats throughout the
data period. In 2011, the industry proposed that all food and beverage
companies use Facts Up Front FOP regime that is almost identical to
the ones adopted by Kellogg’s and General Mills.
Table 2.1 lists summary statistics of 21 major cereal products in-
vestigated in this study. Most of these brands are primarily marketed
to children, such as Kellogg’s Frosted Flakes and General Mills’ Cin-
namon Toast Crunch. I also include a number of major family brand-
s such as General Mills’ Cheerios and Quakers’ Life. Among these
products, Kellogg’s Frosted Flakes Gold was introduced during my
data period and soon recognized as one of the most memorable new
product launch in 2008 (Schneider-Associates 2008).
2.3 Empirical Methodology
2.3.1 Demand Model
I start with specifying a random coefficient consumer utility as in BLP
(Berry et al. 1995, Nevo 2000b, Dube´, Fox and Su 2012). Suppose I
observe t = 1, ...,T markets, the conditional indirect utility of con-
sumer i from purchasing a product j, j = 1, ...,J in market t is given
by:
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ui jt = x jtβi+ξ jt + εi jt , (2.1)
where x jt contains observed product characteristics, βi is a vector
of individual-specific parameter estimates of consumers’ valuation to
each product attribute, ξ jt captures unobserved product characteristics
of product j in market t, and εi jt is a mean zero stochastic term dis-
tributed independently and identically as a type I extreme value distri-
bution. The consumer can choose an outside option with normalized
utility ui0t = εi0t .
The random coefficient of βi is given by:
βi = β +σνi, (2.2)
where β measures the mean preference that is common to all con-
sumers, νi represents the unobserved household characteristics which
assumed to have a standard multivariate normal distribution, and σ is
the variance of the random coefficient βi that is need to be estimated.
Formally, I have the deterministic component of the indirect utility,
x jtβi + ξ jt , consisting of three terms: a partworth utility (Vi jt), label
effects (VLi jt), and context effects (VCi jt) (Rooderkerk, Van Heerde
and Bijmolt 2011, Geyskens et al. 2010):
x jtβi + ξ jt = Vi jt︸︷︷︸
partworth utility
+ VLi jt︸ ︷︷ ︸
label effects




I incorporate product characteristics (Xj) in the partworth utility
for control, including price, advertising exposure, contents of calories,
sugar, saturated fat, sodium, and fiber. (Seetharaman 2004):
Vi j = βiXj. (2.4)
For label effects, I use binary variables of calories, sugar, sodium,
and fiber indicating whether a cereal product has numerical labels of
these nutrients in the front of package as appeared in labeling systems
of Nutrition at a Glance or Nutrition Highlights, interact with numer-
ical value of each specific nutrient (Kj):
VLi j = β labeli L
k
jKj. (2.5)
To incorporate context effects into the choice model, I specify the
contextual component as a linear combination of two context-effect
variables, the compromise variable (COMP j) and the similarity vari-
able (SIMI j):
VCi j = β compi COMP j+β
simi
i SIMI j, (2.6)
where I model context effects as the direct utility gain or loss of prod-
uct j in a choice set S.
Consequently, since εi jt is defined to have a type I extreme value
distribution, by integrating over the set of individual-specific valua-
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tions of attributes the conditional probability that consumers would
purchase product j in market t can be expressed as:
s jt(δt ,σ) =
∫ exp(δ jt +μ jt(ν))
1+∑Jr=1 exp(δrt +μrt(ν))
dPν(ν), (2.7)
where δ jt = x jtβ + ξ jt denotes the mean utility term, and μ jt =
∑k xkjtσ
kνki represents the individual-specific utility term. In empirical
work, the integrals in (2.7) can be evaluated by Monte Carlo simula-
tion. The simulated integrals through N Monte Carlo draws of ν are
given by:








Following Rooderkerk et al. (2011), I operationalize the context vari-
ables by quantifying the relative positions of cereal products in prod-
uct attribute space. I consider four key nutrients of cereals: contents
of calories, sugar, sodium and fiber. I define the distance between any
two products as their Euclidean distance in attribute space by convert-
ing numeric product attributes to categorical variables.
The compromise variable is defined as the Euclidean distance (d)
between product j and the compromise option M in a specific choice
set S:
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COMP j = d j,M. (2.9)
M is defined to contain content of each nutrient averaged over all the
products in the choice set.
Figure 2.4.(a) demonstrates an example of the compromise vari-
able defined in a choice set of the top 20 cereal products in a three-
dimensional characteristic space considering calories, sodium, and
fiber only. The point M in the lower-center is the compromise op-
tion, each other point denotes a cereal product, and different colors of
the points indicating various distances between cereal products to M.
By definition, the solid line connecting M and FF is the compromise
vector of Kellogg’s Frosted Flakes (FF) in this particular choice set.
Because the closer that product j to M is, the smaller the distance and
the compromise variable COMP j will be, I expect that the compro-
mise effect in my specification be negative (i.e. negative coefficient of
β compi ).
The similarity variable is defined as the minimum Euclidean dis-
tance between product j and product r in the choice set S that they
belong to:
SIMI j = minr∈S/{ j}d j,r. (2.10)
As illustrated in Figure 2.4.(b), from the point of view of Kellogg’s
Frosted Flakes (FF), the distance between FF and each other product
varies from 1 to 6 (as shown in different colors). For the reason that
another product of Kellogg’s, Lucky Charms, is the closest product to
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Frosted Flakes in the three-dimensional attribute space, the similarity
vector of Frosted Flakes is the line between FF and LC. Because the
more dissimilar that product j is, the bigger that the similarity variable
SIMI j is, β simii is expected to have a positive sign.
2.3.3 Supply Equilibrium
Following (Nevo 2000a), the profits of firm f is given by:
π f = ∑
j∈Jf
(p j−mcj)×Msj(p)−FCf , (2.11)
where p j is the price of product j, mcj is the marginal cost of produc-
tion which is assumed to be constant (Scherer 1982, Berry, Levinsohn
and Pakes 1999, Nevo 2000a), M denotes the market size, s j(p) is the
market share of brand j that belongs to firm f , and FCf is the fixed
cost of production.
By assuming that at equilibrium, each firm is choosing price of each
product to maximize total firm profits, i.e. the Bertrand-Nash equilib-
rium, the equilibrium price must satisfy the following first order con-
ditions:
s(p)−Ω × ∂ s(p)
∂ p
× (p−mc) = 0, (2.12)





Ω × ∂ sr(p)
∂ p j
]−1× s(p). (2.13)
2.4 Identification and Estimation
2.4.1 Identification
Price is potentially endogenous, and the solution is to involve instru-
mental variables in the estimation. In particular, I assume that the de-
mand unobservables (ξ ) are mean independent of a set of exogenous
instruments, w:
E[ξ |w] = 0. (2.14)
Following the literature, I use cost shifters of cereal products (price
of wheat, firms’ advertising expenditure) (Berry et al. 1999, Nevo
2001), products’ own prices in different markets (Hausman and Taylor
1981), mean demographic features of markets4 (household size, pres-
ence of children under age of 18)(Romeo 2010), as exogenous instru-
ments for prices. Notice that all the non-price product characteristic
variables in X are also valid instruments since they are assumed to be
independent of ξ , and this subset is denoted by X¯ .
In addition, I use a set of optimal instruments to help identify ran-
dom coefficients and increase efficiency. Chamberlain (1987) shows
4 See Romeo (2010) for a discussion of the validity of using mean demographics as instruments in
BLP models.
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that, under conditional moment restrictions, the efficient instruments
are the expected values of the derivatives of the conditional moment
condition with respect to the parameters. (Berry et al. 1999) propose
to use approximations to the optimal instruments for the BLP model.
Reynaert and Verboven (2012) compare the performance of the ap-
proximation and the exact implementation of the optimal instruments,
and demonstrate that both of them can overcome several estimation
problems of the BLP model and increase the estimation efficiency and
stability substantially.
Formally, suppose the vector of parameters is θ = [β ,σ ], then the
set of optimal instruments is given by (Chamberlain 1987, Berry et












where δ is the mean utility, s is the market share.
By replacing the expected values of the derivatives in (2.15) with
the appropriate derivatives evaluated at the expected value of the un-
obeservables, I can construct the approximated optimal instruments
using the following procedure:
(i) Obtain an initial estimate θˆ0 = [βˆ0, σˆ0] by using exogenous in-
strumental variables w.
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(ii) Compute the predicted price pˆ = αˆ1X¯ + αˆ2w from a first-stage
OLS regression, which is also the optimal instrument for price
coefficient56.
(iii) Compute the predicted mean utility, δˆ0 = [X¯ pˆ]′βˆ0.
(iv) Compute the predicted market shares, sˆ0 = s(δˆ0, σˆ0).
(v) Compute the optimal instruments with respect to σ : ∂δ (sˆ0,σˆ0)∂ σˆ0 .
To summarize, in the estimation I use the complete set of instru-
mental variables including cost shifters, Hausman-type instruments,
mean demographic variables, and Chamberlain-type optimal instru-
ments.
2.4.2 GMM Estimator
The demand model specified in Section 2.3.1 can be estimated using a
nonlinear Generalized Methods of Moments (GMM) estimator. I fol-
low Berry et al. (1995) and Dube´ et al. (2012) proposed mathematical
program with equilibrium constraints (MPEC) approach to estimate
parameters of the demand model.
The predicted market shares are restricted to match the observed
shares, where δ can be solved from:
5 For simplicity, the perfect competition is assumed here. Under Bertrand pricing, pˆ can be obtained
by repeatedly solving the first order conditions described in (2.12).
6 The optimal instruments with respect to other parameters in β are the observed product charac-
teristics in Xˆ .
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s(δt ,σ)−Sobs = 0 (2.16)
Let IV be the full set of instrumental variables as described in Sec-
tion 1.4.1, the moment function is given by:






IV ′(δ −X ′β )]= 0 (2.17)
Let A be the GMM weighting matrix and θ be the vector of pa-





s.t. s(δ ,σ) = Sobs,
g= IV ′ξ .
Notice that the set of instrumental variables during estimation plays
a dual role: control for price endogeneity and generate moment con-
ditions to identify random coefficients (Nevo 2012).
2.5 Estimation Results
In this section, I first present demand estimation results and compare
outcomes of different specifications. I then conduct various policies
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and new product introduction simulations to further explore impacts
of different labeling schemes on manufacturers and consumers.
2.5.1 Demand Estimates
Table 2.2 presents parameter estimates for different demand specifi-
cations: column (1) and (2) are from homogeneous multinomial log-
it models, column (3) and (4) are from the random coefficient logit
model that allows for consumer heterogeneity. I instrument for prices
in all four specifications with price of wheat, product level advertising
expenditure, prices of products in different markets, household size
averaged over each market, and mean household’s presence of chil-
dren status averaged over each market. For specification (3) and (4),
a set of optimal instruments as described in Section 2.4.1 is also used
to help identify the random coefficients and improve estimation ef-
ficiency. All of first stage F statistics exceed 10, indicating that the
price instruments are relevant in all specifications. The Hansen J s-
tatistics and p-values suggest that there is no evidence that the price
instruments are correlated with unobserved demand shocks.
All specifications have the partworth utility for control, including
products’ prices, advertising exposure, contents of calories, sugar, sat-
urated fat, sodium and fiber. DMA and month fixed effects are also
included. Specifically, column (1) has context variables of compro-
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mise and similarity effect, and their interactions with the new labeling
system that Kellogg’s and General Mills employed in 2007. Column
(2) consists of both individual label effects (nutrient labels interacted
with numerical contents) and context effects. Column (3) contains in-
dividual label effects, context effects, and interaction terms of context
effects with new labels to capture potential labeling effects on context
variables. Column (4) is similar to (2), except that all the parameters
are random and allow being different across consumers.
Parameter estimates on prices in all specifications are negative and
highly significant. Advertising exposure has a strong positive effect on
consumer choices of breakfast cereal products. Estimates on taste pa-
rameters suggest that consumers generally have negative preferences
on sugar and sodium in cereals. Variances of sugar and fiber are esti-
mated to be significant in specification (4), implying a large deviation
in distribution of how consumers value sugar and fiber in cereal prod-
ucts.
Both the compromise effect and the similarity effect are statistical-
ly significant with expected signs in all specifications, which indicate
that context effects do influence consumers’ choices in choosing ce-
real products in a way that described in Section 2.3.2. Interestingly, in
specification (1), the interaction terms of the new FOP label and con-
text variables are also statistically significant, suggesting that the new
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labeling scheme can affect consumer behavior by fortifying context
effects.
Estimated label effects of different nutrients are of special inter-
ests in evaluating the impacts of Kellogg’s Nutrition at a Glance and
General Mill’s Nutrition Highlights on consumer purchase behaviors
in this paper. In specification (4), the estimated label effects of sug-
ar is negatively related to consumers’ purchase probability, suggest-
ing that the new labels may help consumers avoid high-sugar cereal
products. In contrast, the label of fiber has a positive effect on con-
sumer purchases. Labels of calories and sodium do not significantly
alter consumers’ choices on breakfast cereals from the heterogeneous
specification in column (4).
2.5.2 Price Elasticities, Marginal Costs, and Margins
Table 2.3 reports the estimated own-price elasticities, marginal costs,
and price cost margins (PCM= p−mcp ) obtained using specification (4)
in Table 2.2. Marginal costs are recovered by using Nash-Bertrand e-
quilibrium as described in Section 2.3.3. Consistent with Nevo (2001),
I also find that between two similar products, Kellogg’s Froot Loops
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and Post’s Fruity Pebbles, the one with higher market share has lower
cost 7.
The demand model predicts an average price cost margin of 38%
of popular cereal products in the US market between 2006 to 2008.
Nevo (2001) shows an average predicted PCM of 45% of the cereal
industry using IRI data from 1988 to 1992. The difference in estimated
margins can be explained primarily by the industry-wide price cuts in
1996, which leaded to a significant drop in PCM thereafter (Cotterill,
Putsis and Dhar 2000, Price and Connor 2003).
2.5.3 Policy Simulation and Comparison
A major advantage of using a structural demand model discussed in
previous sections is that it allows researchers to handle counterfactual
predictions and outcomes. To further investigate how different FOP
labels may affect consumer purchases of cereal products, I conduct
policy simulations under five different labeling situations.
In particular, I first simulate consumers’ response when all of the
current FOP labels removed from cereals in Scenario 0. Then I simu-
late an opposite situation when all the products employ the Facts Up
Front type labeling scheme in Scenario 2. Notice that in current prac-
7 Shares of Froot Loops and Fruity Pebbles are 1.28% and 0.71% respectively as shown in Table
2.1.
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tice (Scenario 1), only Kellogg’s and General Mills are using that FOP
label, Post and Quaker are not. In Scenario 3 and 4, I simulate situa-
tions when only “bad” or only “good” nutrients are allowed to appear
on front of packages of cereals, respectively.
After obtaining simulated market shares and prices of each scenario
reported in Table 2.4, the predicted payoffs of each firm under differ-
ent scenarios are calculated and present in Table 2.5. Firms’ payoffs
are measured by yearly gross profits in an average market. Specifi-
cally, compared with Scenario 0 of no FOP labels for all firms, by
employing the new FOP labeling system of both “bad” and “good”
nutrients in Scenario 2, the gross profits of Kellogg’s, General Mills
and Quaker have increased up to 0.7 million dollars per year in an av-
erage DMA, although they may lose market shares of certain brand-
s in their product portfolios. When firms are only allowed to show
“bad” nutrients on front of packages as in Scenario 3, only Kellogg’s
receives higher profits. On the contrary, firms reach the highest lev-
els of predicted profits when they only display FOP labels of “good”
nutrients in Scenario 4.
Given Kellogg’s and General Mills’ current labeling schemes, I ex-
amine potential labeling strategies of Post and Quaker. For both firms,
they can choose to either (1) not participate and remain with existing
labels; or (2) participate and use Facts Up Front style FOP labels sim-
ilar to Kellogg’s and General Mills. Table 2.6 summarizes expected
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payoffs of Post and Quaker for both options in a matrix. When the
two biggest cereal manufacturers, Kellogg’s and Generals, are adopt-
ing the Facts Up Front nutrition labels, the strictly dominant strategy
for Post is to not employ the new FOP labels.
Predicted effects on consumers’ intake of different nutrients are re-
ported in Table 2.7. In particular, compared with the scenario that none
of cereal products have the new FOP labels on their front of package
(S0), the per capita yearly consumption of calories, sugar, and sodi-
um obtained from cereals drops by 8%, 10%, and 6% respectively
because of the adoption of the new labels as shown in Scenario 2.
Meanwhile, the per capita intake of fiber increases by 16%. Although
the improvements in terms of changing consumers’ nutrient compo-
sition from diets are limited, we can see that the new Facts Up Front
style FOP labels are working on the right track. Consumers’ intake of
calories, sugar, and sodium can be further reduced by restricting the
FOP label of fiber as shown in Scenario 3, although consequently fiber
consumption reaches the lowest bound. On the other hand, FOP labels
of only “good” nutrients lead to the highest consumption of calories,
sugar, saturated fat, sodium, and fiber (S4).
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2.5.4 New Product Introduction
The rate of new product introductions is high in the US breakfast ce-
real market, with an average introduction of 10 to 20 new national
brands of leading firms each year (Nevo 2000a, Hitsch 2006). In this
section, I use demand estimates to simulate how the launch of differ-
ent new cereal products would affect the existing choice set, and how
the impacts would be different under alternative labeling schemes.
Specifically, I evaluate scenarios that Kellogg’s launches new national
brands in five scenario, from the least healthy to the healthiest new
product: (1) an “all bad” product - highest calories / sugar / saturat-
ed fat / sodium and lowest fiber; (2) an “all bad but with good fiber”
product - highest calories / sugar / saturated fat / sodium / fiber; (3)
an “all medium” product - median levels of calories/sugar/saturated
fat/sodium/fiber; (4) an “all good but with bad fiber” product - low-
est calories / sugar / saturated fat / sodium / fiber; and (5) an “all
good” product - lowest calories/sugar/saturated fat/sodium and high-
est fiber. Table 8 summarizes product attributes of the new product
in each scenario (N1-N5). I assume that the new product has the av-
erage price, advertising exposure, and marginal cost among all the
other existing products in Kellogg’s portfolio. Product characteristics
of existing brands remain the same, except that the compromise and
similarity variables are recalculated according to the change in choice
set composition. Hence, consumer demand is affected as consumers
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face a new choice set and new relative position of each product in at-
tribute space measured by context variables. For each new product, I
simulate five labeling schemes as described in Section 2.5.3.
Despite the influences of changes in consumers’ choice set, I ex-
pect that each new synthetic product has additional impacts on ex-
isting brands. For example, in N1, the introduction of an “all bad”
new product raises values of the compromise option defined in Sec-
tion 2.3.2 in the new choice set8, which reduces distances between the
compromise option and other cereal products that contain high calo-
ries/sugar/sodium. As a result, these unhealthy products may become
more attractive and have higher consumer purchase probabilities. On
the other hand, the introduction may reduce the minimum Euclidean
distance between two products in the choice set, i.e. smaller similarity
variables. Products that are most similar to the new product in char-
acteristic space are most likely to be affected negatively. The overall
effects of the introduction of the “all bad” product on consumer choic-
es will depend on how consumers value tastes of the new product, the
new product’s own position, and how it changes relative positions of
all the products in the choice set.
Table 2.9 presents market shares before and after introduction of
the Kellogg’s synthetic new products under current labeling schemes.
8 The compromise optionM is [calories, sugar, saturated fat, fiber] = [4.29, 3.48, 3.90, 1.48] before
and [4.41, 3.55, 4.09, 1.41] after the new product introduction.
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Figure 2.5 visually illustrates positions of all five new products in the
existing choice set with contents of calories/sugar/sodium as X/Y/Z
axis, and contents of fiber marked using different colors. The 21 ex-
isting national brands are indicated by small balls. New products are
balls marked with labels (N1 to N5), with different sizes represent-
ing predicted market shares. It is interesting to see that the “all good”
new product in N5 has the dominant share of 4.65%, followed by “all
good but with bad fiber” product in N4, “all bad but with good fiber”
product in N2, and “all bad” product in N1, whereas the “all medium”
product has the lowest predicted share of 1.03% in N3. Although in-
tuitively, the “all medium” product is the closest to the compromise
option among all five new products, other new products may bene-
fit even more from similarity effect and consumer taste preferences.
Notice that the estimated market share of the “all bad” new product
is 1.44% in N1, while the “all bad but with good fiber” new product
has a higher share of 1.76% in N2, implying that the positive label-
ing effect may overcome the negative taste preference of fiber when
consumers meet such not-so-healthy new products. The impacts of d-
ifferent new products on existing brands are mixed. Overall, Kellogg’s
benefit most by introducing the healthiest new product demonstrated
in scenario N5.
I further explore effects of new product introduction on firms under
different labeling systems as reported in Table 2.10. Numbers high-
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lighted in green indicate the optimal new product introduction of Kel-
logg’s under each labeling scheme (row). For Kellogg’s, introducing
an “all good” product (N5) produces highest payoffs under curren-
t labeling system (S1), when all firms employ Facts Up Front style
FOP labels that allow for both “bad” and “good” nutrients (S2), and
when all firms only display “good” nutrients (S4); while an“all good
but with bad fiber” alternative leads to highest predicted gross profits
when firms do not adopt FOP labels (S0) or when “good” nutrients
such as fiber are not allowed on front of packages (S3).
Predicted impacts of new product introduction on consumers are
presented in Table 2.11. For each nutrient of calories, sugar, satu-
rated fat, sodium, and fiber, numbers highlighted in green show the
“healthiest” outcome to consumers of various new products/labeling
schemes combinations, and numbers highlighted in red give the least
healthy combination. To distinguish sources of changes, all of exist-
ing brands are divided into groups of “good” or “bad” depending on
whether each specific product meets the industry-led Children’s Food
and Beverage Advertising Initiative (CFBAI) guidelines of sugar con-
tent9. As expected, the highest sugar and sodium intake happen when
Kellogg’s introduces the “all bad” product (N1) and only shows the
label of fiber on front of cereal packages (S4), and the highest sat-
9 CFBAI allows a maximum sugar content of 38% by weight (CFBAI 2011, Pestano, Yeshua and
Houlihan 2011).
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urated fat intake appears when the “all bad but with good fiber” new
product introduced (N2) under “good-nutrients-only” labeling scheme
(S4). However, when Kellogg’s introduces a relatively healthy alter-
native with lowest levels of calories/sugar/saturated fat/sodium (N4),
impacts on consumers are mixed: although the intake of saturated fat
has the lowest level when firms are all using Facts Up Front style
labels with “bad” nutrients only (S3), the intake of calories reaches
maximum when firms are only displaying labels of “good” nutrients
(S4), and the intake of fiber has the lowest level when only label-
s of “bad” nutrients are allowed (S3). A healthier new product that
contributes to even more consumption of calories than less healthy al-
ternatives implies that the similarity effect (in this case, hurts existing
similar “good” products and benefits dissimilar “bad” products) may
overcome the compromise effect and lead to unexpected public health
consequences10.
2.6 Conclusion
I study the effects of the recently launched Facts Up Front style front-
of-package nutrition labeling system in the ready-to-eat cereal indus-
try. Using a rich data set, I estimate a flexible demand model allowing
10 Notice that under S4 of good labels only, the calorie intake from existing “bad” products in-
creases from 5376.2 to 5512.2 as moving from the least healthy new product in N1 to the healthiest
alternative in N5.
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for consumer heterogeneity and deviating from standard choice as-
sumptions by accounting for context effects. My counterfactual poli-
cy simulations show that the new FOP labels can improve consumers’
consumption of different nutrients. I also find that the food industry
in general would benefit from these policies due to mixed changes
of price cost margins and consumer preferences over different cere-
al brands. Additionally, I explore market outcomes of new product
development under various FOP regimes when context effects are ac-
counted for, and find that a relatively healthy new product would ben-
efit some existing products that are high in calories/sugar/saturated
fat/sodium mainly due to the outperformance of the similarity effect.
This paper is one of the first to contribute to understanding the la-
beling effects of Facts Up Front style FOP labels by applying market
scanner data in a structural demand model. The estimation of the indi-
vidual label effect and predicted counterfactual policy outcomes could
be indicative of policies aimed at markets with similar issues, for ex-
ample, the carbonated soft drink market.
In addition, this paper adds to the literature by empirically prove
that context effects can alter consumer decision-making process in
the breakfast cereal market, and the effects can be reinforced with
the use of FOP labels. As demonstrated in this study, the proposed
structural model incorporated context effects can be easily adapted to
examine the effects of new product introduction to an existing choice
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set by accounting for relative preference changes among alternatives
(i.e. different context variables before/after launch of new products).
The current work has some limitations. Because of the computa-
tional limitation, I do not model the distribution of consumer prefer-
ences as a function of major demographic variables of each market.
The current work is also based on static modeling assumptions. Po-
tential sources for future research include exploring labeling effects
and context effects on households with different demographic statis-
tics (household composition, household size, age of household head,
etc.), and taking into account consumer dynamics, such as stockpiling
behavior that may affect consumer decision-making processes.
Chapter 3
Consumer Within-Category Contemporaneous
Purchasing Behavior: A Multivariate Bayesian
Analysis of the Cereal Market
3.1 Introduction
Consumers choosing two or more different products from the same
category in a shopping trip is very common in a differentiated prod-
uct market, such as when buying carbonated soft drinks or breakfast
cereals in grocery shopping trips. Existing economic and marketing
literature rarely touch upon this consumer within-category multiple
purchasing behavior, and usually ignore the underlying correlations
among chosen items. For example, a consumer may buy both Coke
and Sprite in a shopping trip to accommodate people’s different taste
preferences in a party. Or a consumer may purchase both Kellogg’s
Frosted Flakes and Froot Loops simply because they are both on sale.
In this study, I employ a Multivariate Bayesian approach to study such
contemporaneous within-category multiple purchasing behavior, by
using household level scanner data of the US breakfast cereal market.
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Understanding the within-category simultaneous purchases can be
attractive for several reasons. First, retailers and manufacturers are in-
terested in knowing the composition of consumers’ multiple choices
in a store trip and the underlying dependencies among products. Sec-
ond, the implied within-category “complementary” and “substitute”
products can be critical to both managers and policy makers. For ex-
ample, managers can make use of consumers’ joint purchasing pattens
of one product to induce purchase of the other products, or rationalize
expenditures across subcategories to maximize overall profits. Policy
makers may utilize those insights in designing policy interventions,
discouraging consumption of a certain segment and encouraging con-
sumption of its substitutes at the same time.
The strategic importance of consumer within-category contempo-
raneous demand, along with the relative scarcity of existing research,
motivates this empirical investigation. In particular, I have the fol-
lowing research goals: (1) modeling the within-category multiple pur-
chase incidence that provides improved estimates of marketing mix
variables and unrestricted substitution patterns; (2) isolating correla-
tions of various products in a differentiated product market, and pro-
viding a scheme that naturally implies within-category complements
and substitutes; and (3) understanding what factors other than stan-
dard marketing mix variables (e.g. brand-level price, advertising, etc.)
drive consumer contemporaneous purchases and how they can impact
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those purchasing correlations. For the third goal, I consider three ma-
jor joint factors, including manufacturer effects, section effects (kids
cereals v.s. adult/family cereals), and joint consumer promotion ef-
fects that may originate with the retailer (in-store sales) or the manu-
facturer (coupons).
Previous studies have largely focused on modeling consumers’ dis-
crete choices, by assuming that an individual in a shopping trip is
faced with a finite set of choices from which only one product can be
chosen (common models include the Multinomial Logit Model, Nest-
ed Logit Model, Mixed Logit Model, BLP, etc.). Although theoretical-
ly multiple choice incidences can be modeled by including all possible
combinations, the number of choice situations increases exponentially
with the number of available products in the choice set which makes
it computationally infeasible1. Taking the US breakfast cereal market
for example, according to a panel from the Nielsen Homescan which
tracks a total of 13,985 households and their shopping records of ce-
real products made between 2006 to 2008, 81% of households are
involved in buying two or more distinct cereal brands in a store trip.
As illustrated in Figure 3.1, only 19% of households stick with the
traditional assumption of single purchase. In contrast, proportions of
multiple simultaneous choices of 2, 3, and 4 cereal products are 30% ,
1 For example, if there are 10 products in a choice set, the number of all possible choice situations
need to be considered is 210−1= 1,023.
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24%, and 14%, respectively. As a results, although the single purchase
assumption may be valid in studying consumer behavior of comput-
ers, cars, and other durable goods, it may not be appropriate in the
context of the cereal market and similar differentiated goods, and can
lead to biased estimates of consumers’ responses to marketing mix
variables, incomplete estimates of substitution pattern, and incorrect
managerial predictions (Dube´ 2004). .
To allow for multiple choices behavior and obtain more accurate
estimates of consumer preference parameters as well as more com-
plete substitution patterns of cereal products, I use a multivariate pro-
bit model (MVP) in Bayesian framework and take into account a rela-
tively large number of cereal products in consumers’ choice sets (Chib
and Greenberg 1996, Chib and Greenberg 1998, Manchanda, Ansari
and Gupta 1999, Edwards and Allenby 2003). The MVP model allows
a more flexible modeling of the correlation structure and straightfor-
ward interpretation of the parameters (Chib and Greenberg 1998). As
compared to the Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) and Maxi-
mum Likelihood (ML) methods (Hendel 1999, Dube´ 2004), major ad-
vantages of Bayesian methods are that the Markov chain Monte Car-
lo (MCMC) methods implemented with data augmentation algorithm
can avoid the numerical integration over a multidimensional normal
distribution, easily handle a relatively large dimension of a consumer’s
choices set, and provide unrestricted estimates of the latent normal
65
correlation matrix (Edwards and Allenby 2003), which are especially
suitable for analyzing responses in the differentiated breakfast cereal
market. In addition, Bayesian approach does not rely on large sample
justifications, hence it is particularly useful when the number of ob-
servations is limited in the empirical work on products and markets
(Berry 2003, O’brien and Dunson 2004).
The simulated posterior means of correlation coefficients are then
used to examine the determinants of consumer within-category pur-
chasing correlations. I make the distinction among own- and cross-
manufacturer effects, section effects, and joint promotion effects. To
the best of my knowledge, this is the first study to investigate how
those joint factors can affect consumer contemporaneous purchases of
products in a differentiated product market. Thus, a key contribution
of this work is to provide insights on how consumers react to various
joint marketing mix variables that have been ignored before.
I use a scanner database of 32 national cereal brands over a 3-year
period that contains 713,056 observations, which is unique in the lit-
erature to date in terms of sample size and choice set dimension. I find
substantial evidence that consumers in a shopping trip prefer to buy
multiple items not only from the same manufacturer, but also with-
in the same segment. The implications here are: (1) consumers may
have a strong firm level loyalty, or there are some unobserved market-
ing mix features that induce consumers’ within-firm multiple choices
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(e.g. cereal brands from different manufacturers are usually displayed
separately on shelves in the supermarket environment, thus creating
an in-store firm-level isolation that makes consumers easier to choose
products that lie closer and from the same company; (2) it is somewhat
surprising that consumers treat cereals across different segments as
“substitutes” rather than “complements”, and a pair of children’s ce-
reals have the highest correlation to be purchased together. Addition-
ally, I find that the joint in-store sales and joint manufacture coupons
of a pair of products have significant impacts in increasing their joint
purchasing correlation, besides the mixed effects of own- and cross-
manufacture status and subcategory preferences.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: I first introduce
the first stage Multivariate Probit Model and the Bayesian estimation
procedure in Section 3.2. I then discuss the second stage joint purchas-
ing correlation model in Section 3.3. Section 3.4 describes the data
used in this study. The empirical results of MVP demand estimates
and correlation regression estimates are presented in Section 3.5, with
additional joint promotion simulations. Section 3.6 concludes.
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3.2 Model of Contemporaneous Purchases
3.2.1 The Multivariate Probit Model
Suppose we observe j= 1, ...,J products in the market, and i= 1, ...,N
individuals. Let yi j denote the observed binary response of household
i on product j. In a multivariate probit framework, we model the ob-
served multiple choicesYi = (yi1,yi2, ...,yiJ)′ in terms of a vector of la-
tent utilities, wi = (wi1,wi2, ...,wiJ)′. Xi is a J×k covariate matrix that
contains k product characteristic variables, such as price, advertising
exposure, contents of sugar, sodium, saturated fat, firm dummies, etc.
The utility equations for household i in a shopping trip of buying one
or more choices from J alternatives can be represented as:
wi = Xiβ + εi, (3.1)
and the link between the observed behavior and the latent utilities of




1, if wi j > 0,
0, otherwise.
We assume that the unobserved factors are distributed jointly normal
as:
εi ∼MVN[0,Σ ], (3.2)
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where Σ is a J × J covariance matrix that captures the correlation
in purchase utilities among alternatives. Notice that different from a
multinomial logit or probit model, here it allows to have more than
one products to be purchased simultaneously. In other words, the crit-
ical assumption of allowing only one choice from a set of mutually
exclusive alternatives in MNL and MNP model has been relaxed.
According to the multivariate probit model, the probability thatYi =
yi, conditioned on parameters β , Σ and covariates Xi, is given by (Dey,
Ghosh and Mallick 2000):






















where εi = wi−Xiβ , φJ is the density of a J-variate normal distribu-




(−∞,0], if yi j = 0,
(0,∞), if yi j = 1.
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3.2.2 Priors and Posterior
From a practical perspective, our interest is to focus on the approxi-
mate joint posterior distribution of the parameters and latent variables,
where we assume prior independence between β and Σ :
posterior︷ ︸︸ ︷
π(β ,Σ ,w|y) ∝
prior︷ ︸︸ ︷
π(β ,Σ ,w) ·
likelihood︷ ︸︸ ︷
π(y|β ,Σ ,w) . (3.4)
By Bayes’ rule, (3.4) can be expressed as
π(β ,Σ ,w|y) ∝ π(β ,Σ) ·π(w|β ,Σ) ·π(y|β ,Σ ,w)


















To summarize the posterior distribution, we use the sampling-based
Markov chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) approach and augment the pa-
rameter space to include the latent variable w= (w1, ...,wn) as shown
above. Notice that by using data augmentation method, all informa-
tion from the data of y has transmitted to model parameters through
w.
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Following Rossi, Allenby and McCulloch (2005), a relatively d-
iffuse but proper prior is used in this analysis: β ∼ N(0,100IJ) and
Σ ∼ IW (J+ 2,(J+ 2)IJ). And β , Σ and w can be drawn from the
following conditional distributions:
w|β ,Σ ,y∼ Truncated Normal :
N(m,τ2)× [I(y= 1)I(w> 0)+ I(y= 0)I(w≤ 0)];
(3.7)
β |w,Σ ∼ Normal(β˜ ,Vβ ); (3.8)
Σ |w,β ∼ Inverted Wishart(ν0,VΣ ). (3.9)
The correlation matrix is obtained by specifying the covariance
matrix with unit variance, and it empirically measures the deviation
from independence between any two cereal products (Edwards and
Allenby 2003, Blumgart, Uren, Nielsen, Nash and Reynolds 2011).
3.2.3 MCMC Algorithm
Implementation of the MVP model is adapted from the rmvpGibbs
function of bayesm package in R library (Rossi, Allenby andMcCulloch
2005). In particular, after choosing starting values of w0,β0,Σ0, the
sampling MCMC algorithm repeats the following steps for a large
number of times, r = 1, ...,R:
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1. Sample w from its full conditional truncated normal distribution:
wi j|wi,− j,β ,Σ ,yi ∼ N(mi j,τ2j j)
× [I(yi j = 1)I(wi j > 0)+ I(yi j = 0)I(wi j ≤ 0)],
where
mi j = x′i jβ +F
′(wi,− j−Xi,− jβ ),





2. Sample β from its full conditional distribution: β1|w1,Σ0 ∼N(β˜ ,Vβ ),
where
Vβ = (X















3. Sample Σ from the Inverted Wishart distribution of Σ1|w1,β1 ∼







εi = wi−Xiβ .
3.3 Model of Purchasing Correlations
Estimated MVP correlation coefficients subsequently become the de-
pendent variable in a second stage regression model linking various
joint marketing mix factors to the different joint purchasing corre-
lations. Specifically, the purchasing correlation between brand i and
brand j can be modeled as
Ci j = Intercept+ Joint Promotion Effectsi j
+Manufacturer Effectsi j+Section Effectsi j+ ei j, (3.10)
where Ci j is the estimated correlation coefficient from the first stage
MVP model.
Joint Promotion Effects: The breakfast cereal is one of the most heav-
ily promoted food products (Nevo and Wolfram 2002). According to
a panel of Nielsen Homescan data that tracks households’ purchas-
es of cereal products in 88,029 store trips made between 2006 and
2008, 42% of shopping occasions involves cereal purchases with ei-
ther store sales or manufacturer coupons. Although a large research
effort has been spent on studying the effects of promotions, little is
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known about how consumers react to within-category joint promo-
tions and how that affect their contemporaneous purchases. Therefore,
two types of joint consumer promotions are considered in this study
to explicitly evaluate consumers’ responses: the retailers’ joint tempo-
rary store sales (SS) and manufacturers’ joint coupons (MC). Figure
3.2 gives marketing examples of these joint promotions. Detailed vari-
able operationalization is presented in Section 3.4.2.
Manufacturer Effects: I use a set of manufacturer dummies to capture
observed and unobserved own- and cross-firm characteristics, such
as firms’ marketing strategies of joint display or advertising, con-
sumer company loyalty, etc. For the 4 leading manufacturers studies
in this paper (Kellogg’s, General Mills, Quaker and Post), there are 10
pairwise combinations (dummies) available. For example, Kellogg’s
Frosted Flakes and Special K have the own-firm dummy of “Two of
Kellogg’s Cereals” equal to 1, and General Mills Cheerios and Quaker
Cap’n Crunch have the cross-firm dummy of “One of General Mills
Cereals and One of Quaker Cereals” equal to 1.
Section Effects: For the purpose of this study, I classify cereal products
into two major sections: those primarily targeted to children, and the
others mainly targeted to adults and families. I then have three dummy
variables to indicate the section status of a pair of cereals, which can
capture consumer section preferences of cereal products, as well as
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unobserved section-specific attributes (such as policy interventions on
children cereals).
Because the dependent variables are estimated parameters from the
first stage MVP model, the model residuals may exhibit heteroskedas-
ticity and lead to incorrect standard errors of ordinary least squares
(OLS) estimates. Hence, the heteroskedasticity consistent covariance
matrix (HCCM) HC3 is included to correct for potential heteroskedas-
ticity and obtain robust standard errors (Long and Ervin 2000). The
HC3 estimator provides OLS regression coefficients but calculates s-
tandard errors adjusting for both known and unknown forms of het-
eroskedasticity (Weiss and Reid 2005). The HC3 estimator is given
by






where ei is the model residual and hii represents the diagonal element
of the hat matrix.
3.4 Data Description and Measurement
3.4.1 Description of the Data
Two data sets are employed in this study. The Nielsen Homescan data
tracks households’ purchase records of ready-to-eat cereal products
made from 15 major supermarket chains in 7 designated market areas
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(DMA)2 between Jan 2006 and Dec 2008. Figure 3.3 shows the per-
centage volume sales from those top chains. There are product charac-
teristics information (e.g. flavor, and package), marketing information
(e.g. unit price and promotion), location and time information of each
purchase. The Nielsen Media Research data contains brand-level TV
advertising exposure on a weekly basis matched with the purchase
data. Advertising exposure is measured in gross rating points (GRPs),
which is defined as reach × frequency of a give campaign. For ex-
ample, if a commercial is aired 3 times a week and reaching 50% of
the target audience each time, it would have a weekly GRP of 150
(3×50%).
For this study, I pick 32 popular national cereal brands that belong
to the top 4 cereal manufacturers: Kellogg’s, General Mills, Quaker,
and Post. Table 3.1 lists products with their nutritional information,
and summary statistics of average prices, advertising GRP levels, and
shares. I also categorize all the cereal brands into two groups based
on their targeted markets: kids cereals and adult/family cereals. The
“Kids” variable in Table 3.1 is a binary indicator that equal to 1 if
the cereal product is primarily marketed to children, and equal to 0
if mainly marketed to adults and families. Children’s cereals on aver-
age contain 85% more added sugar compared with family and adults
2 7 DMAs include (New York, Chicago, Detroit, Atlanta, Boston, Hartford, and San Francisco.
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ones (Harris, Schwartz, Brownell, Sarda, Weinberg, Speers, Thomp-
son, Ustjanauskas, Cheyne, Bukofzer et al. 2009b).
Households that have a minimum of 10 purchases of cereal prod-
ucts during a period of 152 weeks are selected (not restricted to the
32 brands examined in this study), yielding a total of 3,126 house-
holds and a sample of 713,056 observations in the first stage MVP
estimation.
3.4.2 Variable Operationalization
Below, I discuss the operationalization of the measures of joint pro-
motions used in the second stage regression. Two types of consumer
promotions are of particular interests in this study: retailers’ in-store
temporary price cuts and manufacturers’ coupons.
The joint store sale variable (SS) is defined as the frequency in
which two distinct cereal brands are simultaneously on temporary
price cuts in sample. For example, if brand i and brand j are on sale
in a particular week/DMA/supermarket chain, it accounts for a sin-
gle joint sale between these two cereal brands. And summing over all
week/DMA/supermarket combinations gives the joint store sale vari-
able of brand i and brand j, SSi j3. As such, it reflects the intensity that
consumers have the opportunity to choose cereals that are jointly on
3 There are a total of 7,963 week/DMA/supermarket chain combinations in sample.
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sale in their shopping trips. Similarly, the joint manufacturer coupon
variable (MC) is defined as the frequency that two cereal products are
observed to be redeemed together. Table 3.2 reports pairwise frequen-
cies of joint manufacturer coupons (the upper triangle) and in-store
sales (the lower triangle) for all 32 cereal products. For example, Kel-
logg’s Frosted Flakes and Mini-Wheats are simultaneously on store
sales for 681 times (out of 7,963 total week/DMA/supermarket chain
combinations in sample), and this means that 8.6% of Frosted Flakes’
store sales are associated with joint promotions of Mini-Wheats.
Cereal products from the same manufacturer or within the same
segment are usually promoted together. Table 3.3 lists the summary
statistics of joint promotion variables in sample. From the table, Kel-
logg’s products have the highest frequencies of being on promotion
together, including both in-store sales and manufacturer coupons, fol-
lowed by products of General Mills, Post, and Quaker. In terms of d-
ifferent cereal segments, products that primarily marketed to children
have the highest joint store sale frequency, as well as joint manufactur-
er coupon frequency. On the contrary, the segment of adult and family
cereals are less seen on sale together in stores, and the least frequency




3.5.1 First Stage Demand Estimates
The proposed first stage MVP model is run for 20,000 iterations with
the every 10th draw kept. After choosing a burn-in length of 300
draws, 1,700 draws are retained from the posterior distributions for
inference purposes.
Table 3.4 presents posterior means of parameters with 95% credi-
ble intervals in parentheses. As expected, price has a negative and sig-
nificant effect on consumers purchase probability of cereal products.
There is a significant, positive effect of advertising exposure targeted
to audience above age of 12, but not of advertising exposure target-
ed to children between age of 2 and 11. This suggests that young kids
may have little influences on their family food choices. Brand fixed ef-
fects are included to control for both observed (e.g. contents of sugar,
calories, sodium, etc.) and unobserved (e.g. product quality, brand loy-
alty, etc.) market-invariant product characteristics4. DMA and quarter
dummies capture the city-specific effect and potential seasonality.
Figure 3.4 accomplishes the results by showing histograms of pos-
terior distributions, trace plots, and autocorrelation functions (ACFs)
summarized from MCMC draws of major marketing mix variables.
4 If needed, taste parameters can be recovered from brand fixed effects by using the minimum
distance procedure described by (Nevo 2001).
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3.5.2 Estimated Within-Category Correlation Matrix
Table 3.5 summarizes parameter estimates of the within-category cor-
relation matrix based on the propose MVP model, after controlling for
marketing mix variables and brand/DMA/quarter fixed effects. A bold
and positive number indicates that the two cereal products are posi-
tively related at 5% level and likely being purchased together, while a
negative number suggests the opposite way.
The off-diagonal elements in the table indicate that correlations
within the cereal category are generally non-zero, with the correla-
tions being quite large for specific pairs of cereal brands. For exam-
ple, the estimated correlation in purchase incidences between Kellog-
g’s Apple Jacks and Froot Loops has a posterior mean of 0.43 that
is significant at 5% level, whereas the estimated correlation between
Kellogg’s Frosted Flakes and General Mills’ Cheerios, both of which
are leading brands of each firm, is -0.21.
Figure 3.5 demonstrates the estimated correlation matrix in a heat
map, with different colors from red to green representing a negative
correlation to a positive correlation. From the heat map, there are more
positive correlations between cereal products from the same manu-
facturer. Surprisingly, products from the same company but different
segments (kids cereals v.s. adult/family cereals) are generally nega-
tively correlated. This indicates that consumers, rather than viewing
all cereal products from the same manufacturer as consumption com-
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plements, only buy cereals that also belong to the same segment for
complementary consumption needs. In other words, consumers show
a somewhat strong firm level loyalty when making contemporaneous
purchases, but their multiple choice behavior seems to be specific
within each cereal segment. These different purchasing correlations
can be attributed to consumers’ segment preferences, company prefer-
ences, and the availability of joint promotions among cereal products,
which are evaluated in the second stage regression.
3.5.3 Second Stage Estimates
The estimated posterior means of correlation parameters are then used
to analyze how they can be impacted by various factors, namely the
manufacturer effect, the segment effect, and the joint promotion effec-
t. Table 3.6 presents parameter estimates for different specifications:
column (1) contains the joint promotion effect of store sales and man-
ufacturer coupons; column (2) adds the own- and cross- manufacturer
effect of Kellogg’s, General Mills, Quaker, and Post; column (3) also
considers the cereal segment effect within the subcategories of kid-
s products and adult/family products; column (4) explicitly evaluates
how joint promotions may have different influences on different seg-
ments of cereal brands by including the interaction terms. Notice that
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firm dummies capture both observed and unobserved manufacture-
specific characteristics other than joint promotional status.
Parameter estimates on both of the joint store sales and joint man-
ufacturers coupons are positive and highly significant, from specifica-
tion (1) to (3). It confirms that joint promotions are positively associat-
ed with consumer simultaneous purchases of a pair of cereal products.
From specification (2) to (4), own-firm effects are positive and signif-
icant, where products of Quaker exhibit the highest correlations to be
purchased together, followed by Post, General Mills, and Kellogg’s.
In contrast, cross-firm parameters show that a pair of cereal product-
s with one from Kellogg’s and the other one from General Mills or
Post are negatively associated with the purchasing correlation. This
is not surprising considering that Kellogg’s was the cereal industry
leader in the US market between 2006 and 2008, and faced more in-
tense competition from rivals. Hence, Kellogg’s had incentives to not
only promote its own products together, but also dissipate consumer
tendency to buy its product along with its major competitors’.
Effects within segments are strong and positive, in which a pair of
kids cereals are the most likely to be purchased together, as shown
in specification (3) and (4). Interaction terms in column (4) suggest
that joint store sales are more effective to the adult/family subcate-
gory, whereas kids cereals benefit the most from joint manufacturer
coupons.
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3.5.4 The Joint Promotion Simulations
To further investigate how different joint promotions may affect con-
sumer purchasing correlations of cereals, I conduct simulations under
four different joint store sale/manufacturer coupon situations. In par-
ticular, I first simulate correlation responses when frequencies of both
joint store sales and manufacturer coupons are increased by 20% in
scenario 1. Then I simulate in scenario 2 that all promotions are re-
moved. In scenario 3 and 4, I simulate situations when only joint store
sales or only joint manufacturer coupons are increased by 20%, re-
spectively.
The predicted average changes in correlation coefficients are sum-
marized in Table 3.7. Specifically, when both promotions are restrict-
ed to have 0 frequencies as in S2, the average correlation declines by
0.0525. On the other hand, by raising the frequencies of both pro-
motions by 20% in S1, pairwise correlations inclines by 0.0105 on
average. And from S3 and S4, joint store sales and joint manufactur-
er coupons attribute to increases of 0.0095 and 0.0010, respectively.
Figure 3.6 accomplishes the simulation results by presenting the cor-
relation heat maps of Scenario 1 and 2. Compared with Figure 3.5,
the increased frequencies of joint promotions can generally raise the
purchasing correlation of a pair of cereal products.
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3.6 Conclusion
This paper has investigated the consumer within-category simultane-
ous demand for breakfast cereals, using a rich dataset of household-
level purchase records over 3 years. The Bayesian MVP approach re-
laxes the “single purchase” assumption that is commonly used in dis-
crete choice models, allows consumer contemporaneous purchases to
be correlated across different products, and is particularly useful for
the data where a large number of alternatives exist as in a differenti-
ated product market. The second stage correlation regressions further
explore determinants of consumer within-category joint purchasing
behavior, which is a research question rarely been addressed before.
Hence, my results should provide valuable insights to both managers
and policy makers.
A majority of consumers are found to buy 2 or more cereal product-
s in a single store trip, and they tend to choose alternatives from the
same manufacturer, either because of the firm-level loyalty or other
unobserved joint marketing strategies. Surprisingly, consumers do not
tend to purchase cereals belong to different segments. Instead, they
prefer to buy a combination of different children’s cereals the most,
followed by a combination of different adult/family cereals and a bun-
dle of mix, implying strong segment preferences of cereal product-
s. Besides manufacture effects and segment effects, joint promotions
are found to be positively associated with consumers contemporane-
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ous purchasing behavior, either in the form of manufacturers’ coupon-
s or retailers’ temporary store sales. This suggests an achievable way
to promote multiple items simultaneously in a differentiated produc-
t market, which has been ignored in previous studies of promotion
effects.
There are some potential areas for future research that can extend
and improve upon current study. First, consumer heterogeneity is not
considered, which can be modeled by adding a lower level to the hier-
archical Bayesian framework. Second, I do not quantitatively measure
the impacts of joint promotions on consumer simultaneous purchase
probabilities, as a consequence, do not provide insight with respec-
t to the market share changes, which may be evaluated in a struc-
tural discrete choice model with a relatively small size of choice set.
Third, more research is needed to distinguish the short-run and long-
run effects of the joint promotions. Also, it would be interesting to
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Calories Sugar Saturated Fat Sodium Fiber Price
(/oz) (g/oz) (g/oz) (mg/oz) (g/oz) ($/oz)
Kellogg's Frosted Flakes 103 11 0 129 1 0.144 3.03%
Kellogg's Raisin Bran 90 8 0 162 3 0.128 2.01%
Kellogg's Froot Loops 110 13 1 132 1 0.170 1.29%
Kellogg's Rice Krispies 108 3 0 254 0 0.193 1.17%
Kellogg's Special K Red Berries 103 9 0 199 1 0.204 1.24%
Kellogg's Apple Jacks 109 12 0 124 0 0.173 0.97%
Kellogg's Corn Pops 106 13 0 108 0 0.173 0.84%
Kellogg's Smart Start 102 8 0 154 2 0.176 0.71%
General Mills Cheerios 103 1 0 186 3 0.188 3.48%
General Mills Cinnamon Toast Crunch 121 9 0 196 1 0.162 1.90%
General Mills Lucky Charms 114 11 0 190 1 0.177 1.47%
General Mills Cocoa Puffs 112 13 0 149 1 0.175 0.88%
General Mills Reese's Puffs 121 11 0 187 1 0.178 0.70%
Quaker Cap'n Crunch 113 12 1 209 1 0.148 0.67%
Quaker Life Cinnamon 104 7 0 134 2 0.144 0.72%
Quaker Cap'n Crunch Crunchberries 113 13 1 196 1 0.153 0.64%
Quaker Cap'n Crunch Peanut Butter Crunch 116 9 1 208 1 0.156 0.40%
Post Honey Bunches of Oats 112 6 0 140 2 0.151 3.39%
Post Fruity Pebbles 112 12 1 164 3 0.167 0.70%
Post Cocoa Pebbles 111 12 1 151 3 0.169 0.57%
Table 1.1 Summary Statistics of Top Ready-to-eat Cereals
Firm Brand Observed Share
Treatment Group Control Group
Demographic Characteristics
Average Household Size 3.32 3.44
Average Female Head's Age 42.80 42.23
Average Male Head's Age 41.21 40.68
% of High Income Households ($60,000 and above/year) 55.54 55.71
% of Hispanic Households 10.13 10.67
% of Female Head with College Degree 49.43 49.94
% of Female Head with Graduate School Degree 9.57 9.10
% of Male Head with College Degree 50.92 51.60
% of Male Head with Graduate School Degree 11.27 10.76
% of Presence of Children Under 6 15.89 16.93
% of Presence of Children 7 to 12 30.13 32.98
% of Presence of Children 13 to 17 29.15 31.80
Cereal Product Characteristics
Average Price Per Ounce ($) 0.17 0.15
Averge Monthly Advertising Exposure (GRP) 357.47 177.30
Averge Monthly % of Promotions 0.43 0.42
Table 1.2 Characteristics of Treatment and Control Groups
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Variable Volume Calories Sugar Sodium Fiber
T 0.108 11.872 0.358 4.534 -0.777
(0.411) (45.217) (3.061) (63.005) (0.739)
G 8.303*** 818.721*** 67.305*** 1,535.771*** 6.734***
(0.538) (54.233) (4.504) (81.741) (1.010)
G*T -1.553** -168.153** -13.901*** -222.034** -0.255
(0.655) (69.457) (5.125) (98.571) (1.151)
Price -27.817*** -2,889.798*** -232.834*** -3,961.526*** -55.650***
(2.429) (205.579) (18.290) (330.213) (3.958)
GRP 0.011*** 1.207*** 0.072*** 1.706*** 0.014***
(0.003) (0.307) (0.022) (0.396) (0.005)
Promotion 0.621 169.221 50.117 -282.518 -17.311
(5.912) (662.503) (45.468) (994.166) (10.586)
Household Size 0.703*** 84.849*** 9.812*** 117.140*** 0.222
(0.160) (16.444) (1.335) (26.588) (0.286)
Household Head Age 0.041*** 3.342** -0.676*** 7.975*** 0.268***
(0.012) (1.342) (0.111) (2.151) (0.027)
High Income 0.765** 80.933** 7.780*** 126.711*** 1.174*
(0.322) (32.563) (2.563) (46.247) (0.686)
Kids Under 6 -0.308 -41.652 -8.345** -83.938 0.798
(0.420) (49.136) (4.043) (68.718) (0.826)
Kids 7 to 12 0.781** 97.409** 12.035*** 116.266* -0.397
(0.375) (39.694) (3.506) (67.548) (0.615)
Kids 13 to 17 1.528*** 180.175*** 25.201*** 231.829*** 0.130
(0.323) (42.123) (3.523) (63.369) (0.719)
Male Graduate School 1.137** 114.904** -5.629 223.307*** 4.535***
(0.547) (47.793) (4.386) (86.545) (0.995)
Male College 0.552 53.113 -6.513** 118.841** 2.277***
(0.353) (37.797) (2.682) (59.819) (0.590)
Female Graduate School 0.453 47.167 -8.855** 97.784 2.100**
(0.547) (54.333) (4.348) (81.097) (0.976)
Female College 0.407 42.767 2.881 75.767 1.210**
(0.326) (34.160) (2.859) (50.354) (0.587)
Constant 8.956*** 950.677*** 92.309*** 1,432.091*** 25.365***
(2.979) (340.931) (25.293) (517.056) (5.882)
DMA Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 11,813 11,813 11,813 11,813 11,813
Table 1.3 Mean Outcomes and Impacts
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses calculated using 200 bootstrap replications. ***, **, and * indicate 
statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Variable 5% 25% 50% 75% 95%
T -0.023 0.040 0.266 0.153 1.281
(0.060) (0.180) (0.295) (0.587) (1.743)
G 1.395*** 4.702*** 7.668*** 11.007*** 16.233***
(0.184) (0.317) (0.464) (0.714) (2.375)
G*T -0.695*** -0.862** -1.787*** -1.012 -3.913
(0.214) (0.358) (0.554) (0.975) (2.509)
Price -2.309*** -10.875*** -22.267*** -45.715*** -90.767***
(0.465) (1.407) (1.594) (3.385) (8.660)
GRP 0.000 0.005*** 0.011*** 0.012*** 0.031**
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.013)
Promotion 0.310 -2.298 1.187 7.906 -9.859
(1.039) (3.362) (4.868) (8.476) (25.611)
Household Size 0.009 0.228*** 0.648*** 1.055*** 1.119*
(0.032) (0.080) (0.139) (0.210) (0.597)
Household Head Age 0.006*** 0.017** 0.007 0.034* 0.126**
(0.002) (0.008) (0.010) (0.020) (0.054)
High Income 0.122** 0.598*** 0.636** 0.888* 1.101
(0.057) (0.185) (0.285) (0.459) (1.261)
Kids Under 6 0.052 0.087 0.028 -1.061 -0.803
(0.093) (0.258) (0.403) (0.700) (1.848)
Kids 7 to 12 0.122* 0.262 -0.186 -0.127 4.137***
(0.068) (0.197) (0.337) (0.616) (1.363)
Kids 13 to 17 0.144* 0.650*** 1.046*** 2.369*** 3.184**
(0.075) (0.197) (0.349) (0.607) (1.541)
Male Graduate School -0.074 0.425 1.132** 2.220*** 3.459*
(0.099) (0.343) (0.468) (0.791) (1.926)
Male College 0.111* 0.429** 0.544* 0.423 0.835
(0.066) (0.207) (0.293) (0.506) (1.322)
Female Graduate School 0.157 -0.186 0.229 1.088 1.203
(0.118) (0.322) (0.535) (0.905) (2.068)
Female College 0.027 -0.105 0.207 1.002** 0.908
(0.054) (0.192) (0.239) (0.438) (1.114)
Constant 1.232** 4.555** 7.008*** 12.377** 36.196***
(0.578) (1.884) (2.586) (4.910) (13.147)
DMA Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 11,813 11,813 11,813 11,813 11,813
Table 1.4 Quantile Difference-In-Difference Outcomes and Impacts on Volume
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses calculated using 200 bootstrap replications. ***, **, and * indicate 
statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Variable 5% 25% 50% 75% 95%
T -3.651 1.133 30.515 29.704 138.148
(6.460) (20.235) (31.802) (65.736) (177.036)
G 148.579*** 483.999*** 782.643*** 1,095.461*** 1,536.150***
(20.480) (31.981) (54.862) (72.713) (256.395)
G*T -81.790*** -81.720** -170.510*** -126.161 -392.961
(23.645) (38.758) (59.515) (105.223) (257.485)
Price -270.650*** -1,177.468*** -2,428.081*** -4,988.912*** -10,181.860***
(50.919) (152.709) (174.529) (380.166) (968.231)
GRP 0.018 0.506*** 1.187*** 1.415*** 3.381**
(0.112) (0.169) (0.256) (0.400) (1.419)
Promotion 37.905 -288.946 134.494 1,017.315 -1,283.458
(109.816) (367.412) (487.794) (883.477) (2,846.883)
Household Size 1.058 28.042*** 78.793*** 126.745*** 156.553**
(3.481) (8.976) (16.393) (23.780) (66.142)
Household Head Age 0.542** 1.291 0.194 3.260 9.344*
(0.231) (0.825) (1.118) (2.210) (5.527)
High Income 12.502* 63.499*** 65.107** 81.963* 115.024
(6.524) (19.725) (32.637) (48.068) (138.765)
Kids Under 6 8.158 15.902 -10.817 -117.623 -118.488
(10.607) (28.220) (44.954) (72.839) (194.087)
Kids 7 to 12 12.923* 21.671 -17.968 13.432 507.689***
(7.751) (22.836) (40.672) (64.711) (157.804)
Kids 13 to 17 20.725** 73.608*** 125.194*** 241.109*** 368.222**
(8.194) (23.105) (39.839) (66.348) (169.845)
Male Graduate School -6.105 38.662 132.371** 214.511** 39.829
(11.434) (35.749) (55.025) (93.301) (227.329)
Male College 11.053 40.606* 53.241* 42.929 -27.704
(7.154) (22.073) (32.263) (51.793) (151.512)
Female Graduate School 20.890 -37.790 22.798 144.170 225.831
(13.053) (35.015) (60.310) (100.589) (230.663)
Female College 4.386 -10.754 24.594 114.795** 146.091
(6.271) (20.595) (28.398) (46.705) (118.731)
Constant 141.736** 533.794*** 780.902*** 1,266.310** 4,179.152***
(59.549) (197.691) (268.409) (514.456) (1,449.838)
DMA Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 11,813 11,813 11,813 11,813 11,813
Table 1.5 Quantile Difference-In-Difference Outcomes and Impacts on Calories
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses calculated using 200 bootstrap replications. ***, **, and * indicate 
statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Variable 5% 25% 50% 75% 95%
T -0.816 0.424 3.239 -0.342 3.328
(0.612) (1.487) (2.836) (4.692) (13.371)
G 1.001 21.035*** 50.416*** 88.042*** 182.529***
(1.204) (2.648) (4.204) (7.237) (20.547)
G*T -2.037* -5.739** -12.171** -15.561* -41.619*
(1.130) (2.551) (5.473) (8.048) (23.237)
Price -29.064*** -88.980*** -168.464*** -366.310*** -672.913***
(4.772) (10.348) (15.914) (30.970) (73.902)
GRP 0.010 0.033*** 0.056** 0.093*** 0.170*
(0.006) (0.013) (0.023) (0.036) (0.095)
Promotion 10.579 39.370 87.048** 142.932** -105.932
(10.248) (27.244) (39.097) (66.795) (216.071)
Household Size 0.735** 4.130*** 9.132*** 13.513*** 17.427***
(0.358) (0.834) (1.264) (2.255) (5.824)
Household Head Age -0.101*** -0.308*** -0.604*** -1.042*** -0.729
(0.026) (0.060) (0.086) (0.157) (0.481)
High Income 1.483** 4.685*** 7.336*** 11.334*** 10.361
(0.724) (1.544) (2.643) (4.369) (11.966)
Kids Under 6 -0.267 -4.079* -1.975 -16.842** -11.594
(1.146) (2.438) (3.293) (6.597) (17.466)
Kids 7 to 12 1.861** 3.494* 2.514 6.237 42.982***
(0.872) (1.910) (3.646) (6.470) (14.699)
Kids 13 to 17 2.301** 10.229*** 19.268*** 32.230*** 66.012***
(0.989) (2.112) (3.193) (4.995) (16.748)
Male Graduate School -1.188 -2.300 -3.585 6.008 -32.337**
(1.047) (2.536) (3.881) (6.606) (15.465)
Male College -0.868 -0.893 -3.120 -5.738 -30.257**
(0.718) (1.602) (2.429) (4.292) (12.923)
Female Graduate School -1.712 -5.004*** -8.108* -5.924 -13.760
(1.079) (1.843) (4.403) (6.065) (17.971)
Female College -0.084 -1.847 -0.622 3.827 13.002
(0.703) (1.370) (2.402) (3.905) (10.732)
Constant 13.329** 24.707* 44.085** 111.137*** 394.765***
(6.153) (12.882) (21.510) (38.877) (114.125)
DMA Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 11,813 11,813 11,813 11,813 11,813
Table 1.6 Quantile Difference-In-Difference Outcomes and Impacts on Sugar
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses calculated using 200 bootstrap replications. ***, **, and * indicate 
statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Variable 5% 25% 50% 75% 95%
T -15.038 0.302 40.591 51.393 134.993
(10.891) (30.664) (48.582) (91.221) (263.330)
G 244.270*** 841.681*** 1,291.398*** 2,159.016*** 3,279.327***
(27.843) (50.063) (80.694) (131.478) (341.417)
G*T -76.021** -163.267*** -227.398** -221.560 -501.108
(37.103) (61.864) (98.135) (160.601) (397.310)
Price -444.755*** -1,624.739*** -3,447.540*** -6,842.233*** -12,854.158***
(71.581) (199.501) (262.409) (601.546) (1,400.312)
GRP -0.019 0.829*** 1.877*** 1.689** 4.184**
(0.143) (0.248) (0.402) (0.733) (1.674)
Promotion -8.928 -743.827 -46.625 707.404 -3,729.415
(210.571) (560.751) (753.504) (1,391.859) (4,191.486)
Household Size 3.039 33.301*** 118.976*** 193.438*** 310.332***
(6.039) (12.221) (24.918) (34.637) (90.014)
Household Head Age 1.098** 2.393* 2.398 7.053** 16.803**
(0.459) (1.242) (1.669) (3.254) (7.955)
High Income 15.484 85.054*** 116.898** 147.650* 111.438
(12.791) (30.497) (47.242) (79.814) (190.605)
Kids Under 6 15.690 2.528 -24.761 -203.067 -210.671
(17.387) (46.694) (70.409) (125.169) (264.012)
Kids 7 to 12 31.654** 67.232** -22.526 -61.928 439.883*
(13.898) (34.229) (62.227) (96.515) (250.589)
Kids 13 to 17 39.462*** 117.166*** 186.144*** 316.248*** 362.088
(13.797) (34.027) (57.860) (104.746) (235.728)
Male Graduate School 0.555 49.484 205.658** 429.135*** 602.134*
(20.243) (48.034) (85.767) (137.467) (328.576)
Male College 26.526** 77.505** 60.432 60.463 194.220
(13.445) (33.779) (45.450) (86.710) (192.824)
Female Graduate School 35.519** -54.139 86.189 105.271 85.324
(18.064) (50.448) (82.759) (158.733) (374.304)
Female College 6.127 -16.343 59.250 152.748** 282.622
(10.808) (31.614) (38.056) (70.955) (177.128)
Constant 236.596** 883.518*** 1,134.557*** 2,025.206** 6,299.041***
(114.036) (298.286) (415.363) (867.371) (2,145.352)
DMA Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 11,813 11,813 11,813 11,813 11,813
Table 1.7 Quantile Difference-In-Difference Outcomes and Impacts on Sodium
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses calculated using 200 bootstrap replications. ***, **, and * indicate 
statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Variable 5% 25% 50% 75% 95%
T -0.211 -0.211 -0.506 -1.883 -2.402
(0.192) (0.327) (0.611) (1.256) (3.441)
G -0.245 2.390*** 5.174*** 8.027*** 14.368**
(0.255) (0.493) (0.868) (1.625) (5.610)
G*T 0.228 -0.113 -1.286 0.739 1.275
(0.320) (0.637) (0.954) (1.849) (5.003)
Price -3.539*** -18.067*** -38.145*** -83.259*** -187.771***
(0.929) (1.867) (3.431) (6.700) (16.538)
GRP -0.003** 0.005* 0.014*** 0.020** 0.032
(0.001) (0.003) (0.004) (0.009) (0.030)
Promotion -0.849 -2.653 -11.426 -29.115* -92.164
(2.957) (4.894) (7.723) (15.439) (58.160)
Household Size -0.001 0.149 0.579** 1.067*** 0.513
(0.067) (0.145) (0.264) (0.394) (0.992)
Household Head Age 0.024*** 0.068*** 0.124*** 0.335*** 0.794***
(0.006) (0.012) (0.020) (0.042) (0.133)
High Income 0.072 0.842*** 1.208** 1.124 1.321
(0.152) (0.269) (0.562) (0.937) (2.987)
Kids Under 6 0.469* 0.419 0.288 0.638 2.313
(0.252) (0.403) (0.682) (1.457) (3.729)
Kids 7 to 12 -0.001 0.254 -0.613 -1.768 -3.613
(0.188) (0.364) (0.549) (1.135) (2.352)
Kids 13 to 17 0.175 0.396 0.465 0.509 -2.446
(0.189) (0.346) (0.665) (1.123) (3.031)
Male Graduate School -0.005 1.515*** 3.526*** 5.057** 13.868***
(0.257) (0.519) (0.942) (1.969) (4.038)
Male College 0.075 0.962*** 1.700*** 1.780* 6.723**
(0.180) (0.358) (0.547) (1.027) (2.942)
Female Graduate School 0.306 0.332 0.603 2.815 6.028
(0.269) (0.453) (0.859) (1.741) (4.889)
Female College 0.166 0.261 0.342 1.688* 3.622
(0.145) (0.290) (0.479) (0.972) (2.769)
Constant 2.661* 7.084*** 19.036*** 39.683*** 107.110***
(1.597) (2.733) (4.402) (8.799) (31.101)
DMA Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 11,813 11,813 11,813 11,813 11,813
Table 1.8 Quantile Difference-In-Difference Outcomes and Impacts on Fiber
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses calculated using 200 bootstrap replications. ***, **, and * indicate 
statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Subgroups Volume Calories Sugar Sodium Fiber
(1) Female Head: High School -3.852*** -398.747*** -35.861*** -568.227*** -3.243**
(0.893) (84.829) (7.565) (122.768) (1.407)
(2) Female Head: College -1.533** -165.335** -24.943*** -246.859* 1.195
(0.738) (81.641) (6.803) (133.951) (1.369)
(3) Female Head: Graduate School 0.513 55.411 9.908 -79.258 0.331
(1.941) (219.778) (15.797) (313.466) (4.012)
(4) Male Head: High School -4.042*** -423.039*** -38.737*** -662.338*** -3.586**
(0.837) (82.783) (9.433) (166.336) (1.732)
(5) Male Head: College -1.193 -124.421 -19.306*** -171.239 1.548
(0.752) (78.275) (6.762) (118.227) (1.412)
(6) Male Head: Graduate School -1.704 -180.913 -10.857 -246.012 -2.801
(1.575) (184.198) (12.747) (245.516) (2.917)
Table 1.9 Treatment Effects of Households' Head at Different Educational Attainments
Notes: Results from DID regressions with individual fixed effects to eliminate any other observed and unobserved 
houshold  heterogeneity. Only results of the mean DID estimates (G*T) are shown above. Standard errors in 
parentheses calculated using 200 bootstrap replications. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, 
and 10% levels, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Subgroups Volume Calories Sugar Sodium Fiber
(1) Kids Under 6 -0.170 -9.770 2.171 9.000 -0.711
(0.573) (68.488) (5.429) (97.431) (0.871)
(2) Kids 7 to 12 -1.202** -126.125** -9.131** -185.710* -1.347
(0.503) (56.819) (4.238) (94.987) (0.847)
(3) Kids 13 to 17 -1.802*** -187.717*** -15.798*** -304.822*** -2.235***
(0.497) (62.072) (4.814) (81.313) (0.752)
(4) No Kids Under 17 -0.160 -8.791 -4.920 -2.691 0.166
(0.410) (46.968) (3.941) (66.771) (0.840)
Table 1.10 Treatment Effects of Households with Children at Different Age Groups
Notes: Results from DID regressions with individual fixed effects to eliminate any other observed and unobserved 
houshold  heterogeneity. Only results of the mean DID estimates (G*T) are shown above. Standard errors in 
parentheses calculated using 200 bootstrap replications. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, 
and 10% levels, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Variable Volume Calories Sugar Sodium Fiber
T 0.108 11.872 0.358 4.534 -0.777
(0.286) (32.822) (2.298) (46.521) (0.482)
G 8.303*** 818.721*** 67.305*** 1,535.771*** 6.734***
(0.483) (50.724) (4.142) (85.836) (1.162)
G*T -1.553*** -168.153*** -13.901*** -222.034*** -0.255
(0.408) (54.414) (3.884) (83.905) (0.729)
Price -27.817*** -2,889.798*** -232.834*** -3,961.526*** -55.650***
(2.282) (258.713) (18.881) (394.414) (5.004)
GRP 0.011*** 1.207*** 0.072*** 1.706*** 0.014**
(0.003) (0.289) (0.022) (0.486) (0.006)
Promotion 0.621 169.221 50.117 -282.518 -17.311*
(4.934) (605.580) (50.516) (823.271) (10.085)
Household Size 0.703*** 84.849*** 9.812*** 117.140*** 0.222
(0.190) (21.330) (1.618) (33.423) (0.300)
Household Head Age 0.041** 3.342* -0.676*** 7.975*** 0.268***
(0.016) (1.748) (0.170) (2.619) (0.035)
High Income 0.765* 80.933* 7.780** 126.711** 1.174
(0.394) (47.031) (3.171) (61.385) (0.784)
Kids Under 6 -0.308 -41.652 -8.345* -83.938 0.798
(0.472) (58.754) (4.937) (98.299) (0.947)
Kids 7 to 12 0.781* 97.409* 12.035*** 116.266 -0.397
(0.451) (54.614) (4.586) (77.440) (0.736)
Kids 13 to 17 1.528*** 180.175*** 25.201*** 231.829*** 0.130
(0.413) (48.961) (4.564) (75.881) (0.792)
Male Edu Graduate School 1.137** 114.904 -5.629 223.307** 4.535***
(0.569) (70.048) (5.935) (100.009) (1.325)
Male Edu College 0.552 53.113 -6.513** 118.841* 2.277***
(0.386) (41.135) (3.234) (71.696) (0.751)
Female Edu Graduate School 0.453 47.167 -8.855 97.784 2.100*
(0.629) (62.779) (5.570) (102.602) (1.203)
Female Edu College 0.407 42.767 2.881 75.767 1.210
(0.403) (37.622) (3.328) (59.102) (0.808)
Constant 8.956*** 950.677*** 92.309*** 1,432.091*** 25.365***
(3.015) (351.223) (30.189) (468.886) (6.410)
DMA Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 11,813 11,813 11,813 11,813 11,813
Table A1.1 Robustness Regressions of Mean Outcomes with Clustered Standard Errors
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses calculated using 200 bootstrap replications and clustered at household 
level. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Variable Volume Calories Sugar Sodium Fiber
T -0.645*** -73.856*** -6.582*** -100.162*** -0.975***
(0.180) (20.588) (1.562) (30.713) (0.342)
G 0.571** 58.219** 5.655*** 83.298** 0.664
(0.222) (23.045) (1.990) (37.727) (0.409)
G*T -1.143*** -116.478*** -11.314*** -166.658*** -1.328
(0.332) (37.851) (3.205) (58.848) (1.587)
Price -15.754*** -1,654.061*** -129.831*** -2,459.105*** -30.380***
(1.989) (257.526) (19.659) (343.443) (3.682)
GRP 0.002 0.220 -0.001 0.238 0.019***
(0.004) (0.477) (0.044) (0.738) (0.007)
Promotion -3.588 -423.502 -40.801 -342.005 2.222
(4.702) (485.583) (40.565) (646.379) (8.181)
Constant 0.322** 36.881*** 3.287*** 50.017** 0.487**
(0.126) (13.628) (0.971) (20.713) (0.235)
Observations 11,813 11,813 11,813 11,813 11,813
Table A1.2 Robustness Regressions of Mean Outcomes with Individual Fixed Effects
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses calculated using 200 bootstrap replications. ***, **, and * indicate 
statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
Calories Sugar Saturated Fat Sodium Fiber Price
Observed 
Share
(/oz) (g/oz) (g/oz) (mg/oz) (g/oz) ($/oz) (%)
Kellogg's Frosted Flakes 103 11 0 129 1 0.150 2.98
Kellogg's Raisin Bran 90 8 0 162 3 0.134 1.94
Kellogg's Froot Loops 110 13 1 132 1 0.181 1.28
Kellogg's Rice Krispies 108 3 0 254 0 0.199 1.15
Kellogg's Special K Red Berries 103 9 0 199 1 0.204 1.29
Kellogg's Apple Jacks 109 12 0 124 0 0.184 0.92
Kellogg's Corn Pops 106 13 0 108 0 0.185 0.82
Kellogg's Smart Start 102 8 0 154 2 0.182 0.64
Kellogg's Frosted Flakes Gold 101 9 0 173 3 0.148 0.33
General Mills Cheerios 103 1 0 186 3 0.191 3.91
General Mills Cinnamon Toast Crunch 121 9 0 196 1 0.167 2.16
General Mills Lucky Charms 114 11 0 190 1 0.192 1.71
General Mills Cocoa Puffs 112 13 0 149 1 0.186 0.76
General Mills Reese's Puffs 121 11 0 187 1 0.188 0.78
Quaker Cap'n Crunch 113 12 1 209 1 0.151 0.70
Quaker Life Cinnamon 104 7 0 134 2 0.148 0.65
Quaker Cap'n Crunch Crunchberries 113 13 1 196 1 0.157 0.65
Quaker Cap'n Crunch Peanut Butter Crunch 116 9 1 208 1 0.160 0.47
Post Honey Bunches of Oats 112 6 0 140 2 0.157 3.51
Post Fruity Pebbles 112 12 1 164 3 0.173 0.71
Post Cocoa Pebbles 111 12 1 151 3 0.178 0.52
Firm Brand
Table 2.1 Summary Statistics of Top Ready-to-Eat Cereal Products
Homogenous MNL Homogenous MNL
(1) (2)
Variable Mean Deviation Mean Deviation
Partworths
Price -6.653*** -7.175*** -2.537** 0.558 -8.905*** 0.961
(0.770) (0.837) (1.031) (6.490) (1.664) (16.557)
Advertising Goodwill 1.928*** 1.824*** 1.287*** 5.673*** 1.780* 12.643***
(0.090) (0.092) (0.502) (1.107) (1.002) (3.729)
Calories -0.566 -0.735* -1.470** 0.034 -0.164 0.941
(0.392) (0.414) (0.740) (3.437) (1.442) (3.797)
Sugar -0.920*** -0.463*** -0.398*** 0.087 -0.814*** 4.255**
(0.104) (0.113) (0.150) (3.090) (0.267) (1.675)
Saturated Fat -0.062 -0.192*** -0.524 6.055*** -0.413 1.361
(0.046) (0.048) (1.006) (1.975) (0.343) (2.446)
Sodium -1.523*** -1.171*** -1.543*** 0.065 -0.927* 0.810
(0.107) (0.119) (0.174) (4.983) (0.504) (4.867)
Fiber -0.354*** -0.184 -0.185 1.414 -0.652 3.614**
(0.064) (0.061) (0.279) (1.298) (1.074) (1.652)
Constant -0.584 -0.898** -2.346*** 0.143 -2.241** 0.879
(0.394) (0.413) (0.620) (2.746) (1.041) (2.759)
DMA Fixed Effects Yes Yes
Month Fixed Effects Yes Yes
Label Effects
Label * Calories 1.721* 0.833 1.694 -0.010 1.025
(0.941) (1.360) (2.224) (2.614) (3.092)
Label * Sugar -1.940*** -1.534*** 0.119 -0.634** 3.139
(0.187) (0.316) (3.263) (0.251) (2.599)
Label * Sodium -2.448*** -2.813 0.695 -0.563 3.444
(0.323) (2.023) (5.044) (3.823) (3.824)
Label * Fiber 0.492*** 0.226 0.264 0.108* 3.338
(0.109) (0.550) (4.604) (0.058) (2.564)
Context Effects
Compromise Variable -1.449*** -1.527*** -0.973*** 0.132 -2.358* 0.852
(0.159) (0.152) (0.259) (2.277) (1.308) (5.780)
Similarity Variable 2.524*** 2.761*** 2.240*** 0.220 2.721*** 2.804
(0.170) (0.185) (0.205) (2.885) (0.478) (1.735)
Label * Compromise Variable -0.205* -0.007 0.265
(0.114) (1.067) (8.882)
Label * Similarity Variable 0.376** 0.190 2.484
(0.175) (1.332) (5.992)
Observations 7,787 7,787
First Stage F Statistic 28.596 24.862
p-value 0.000 0.000
Hansen J Statistic 11.385 10.241
p-value 0.077 0.115
Table 2.2 Parameter Estimates of Demand Models
7,787


















Firm Brand Own-Price Elasticity
Marginal Cost 
($/oz) PCM (%)
Kellogg's Frosted Flakes -2.781 0.064 57.2
Kellogg's Raisin Bran -2.544 0.066 50.6
Kellogg's Froot Loops -3.345 0.088 51.2
Kellogg's Rice Krispies -3.820 0.130 34.7
Kellogg's Special K Red Berries -3.878 0.127 37.8
Kellogg's Apple Jacks -3.503 0.111 39.6
Kellogg's Corn Pops -3.541 0.114 38.7
Kellogg's Smart Start -3.462 0.109 39.9
Kellogg's Frosted Flakes Gold -2.909 0.096 35.2
General Mills Cheerios -3.656 0.132 30.7
General Mills Cinnamon Toast Crunch -3.275 0.115 31.1
General Mills Lucky Charms -3.747 0.139 27.7
General Mills Cocoa Puffs -3.630 0.133 28.6
General Mills Reese's Puffs -3.595 0.129 31.0
Quaker Cap'n Crunch -2.811 0.087 42.3
Quaker Life Cinnamon -2.750 0.084 43.1
Quaker Cap'n Crunch Crunchberries -2.969 0.096 38.5
Quaker Cap'n Crunch Peanut Butter Crunch -3.007 0.097 39.3
Post Honey Bunches of Oats -2.956 0.099 36.9
Post Fruity Pebbles -3.296 0.116 32.8
Post Cocoa Pebbles -3.381 0.121 32.2



















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































S0: No Label S1: Current Practice
S2: All with 
Bad and Good 
Labels
S3: All with 
Bad Labels 
Only
S4: All with 
Good Labels 
Only
Gross Profit Gross Profit Gross Profit Gross Profit Gross Profit
Kellogg's 10.4 10.9 11.1 10.5 13.0
General Mills 6.8 6.8 7.0 6.5 8.7
Quaker 1.9 2.0 2.0 1.9 2.0
Post 2.8 3.2 2.7 2.4 3.4
Table 2.5 Predicted Firms' Yearly Gross Profits In An Average Market ($1,000,000)
Not Participate Participate
Not Participate  (3.2, 2.0)  (3.7, 1.9) 
Participate (2.8, 2.2)  (2.7, 2.0) 




Note. All payoffs are calculated given that Kellogg's and General Mills are 
adopting Facts Up Front style FOP labels. In each parentheses, the first 
number is Post's payoff and the second number is Quaker's.
S0: No Label S1: Current Practice
S2: All with 
Bad and Good 
Labels
S3: All with 
Bad Labels 
Only
S4: All with 
Good Labels 
Only
Intake Intake Intake Intake Intake
Calories 8210 8187.1 7587.2 7003.9 9168.8
Sugar (g) 655 630.9 589.9 559.1 710.3
Saturated Fat (g) 11.2 11.8 11.9 11.3 12.3
Sodium (mg) 12580.0 12665.7 11824.0 10903.4 14116.9
Fiber (g) 96.0 101.4 111.4 91.7 126.2
Table 2.7 Predicted Consumer Yearly Per Capita Intake from Breakfast Cereals
N1: All Bad
N2: All Bad 




N4: All Good 
but with Bad 
Fiber
N5: All Good
Calories (/oz) 121 121 108 90 90
Sugar (g/oz) 13 13 8 1 1
Saturated Fat (g/oz) 1 1 1 0 0
Sodium (mg/oz) 254 254 180 108 108
Fiber (g/oz) 0 3 2 0 3


































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































N2: All Bad 




N4: All Good 
but with Bad 
Fiber
N5: All Good
Payoff Payoff Payoff Payoff Payoff Payoff 
Kellogg's
S0: No Label 10.4 13.3 13.0 13.7 15.4 15.1
S1: Current Practice 10.9 13.4 13.1 13.9 15.1 15.7
S2: All with Bad and Good Labels 11.1 13.4 13.2 13.5 15.0 16.5
S3: All with Bad Labels Only 10.5 12.8 12.5 12.8 14.7 14.6
S4: All with Good Labels Only 13.0 16.2 16.0 16.8 18.4 19.6
General Mills
S0: No Label 6.8 8.2 8.1 8.0 7.5 7.3
S1: Current Practice 6.8 8.5 8.5 8.4 8.0 7.6
S2: All with Bad and Good Labels 7.0 8.6 8.7 8.6 8.1 7.6
S3: All with Bad Labels Only 6.5 8.3 8.3 8.2 7.8 7.5
S4: All with Good Labels Only 8.7 10.8 10.7 10.6 10.0 9.5
Quaker
S0: No Label 1.9 4.2 4.3 3.7 4.5 4.5
S1: Current Practice 2.0 4.6 4.7 4.1 4.9 4.8
S2: All with Bad and Good Labels 2.0 4.0 4.0 3.6 4.3 4.2
S3: All with Bad Labels Only 1.9 3.5 3.6 3.3 3.9 4.0
S4: All with Good Labels Only 2.0 4.7 4.7 4.0 5.0 4.8
Post
S0: No Label 2.8 2.5 2.6 2.5 2.4 2.4
S1: Current Practice 3.2 3.7 3.8 3.7 3.4 3.4
S2: All with Bad and Good Labels 2.7 2.6 2.6 2.5 2.4 2.3
S3: All with Bad Labels Only 2.4 2.0 2.1 2.0 1.9 1.8
S4: All with Good Labels Only 3.4 3.2 3.2 3.2 2.9 2.8





























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Sugar Sat. Fat Sodium Fiber Protein Ave. Price
(g/oz) (g/oz) (mg/oz) (g/oz) (g/oz) ($/oz)
Kellogg's Frosted Mini-Wheats 96 6 0 3 3 3 0.1439 76.6 4.34% 1
Kellogg's Frosted Flakes 103 11 0 129 1 1 0.1468 187.3 4.48% 1
Kellogg's Froot Loops 110 13 1 132 1 1 0.1723 95.9 2.08% 1
Kellogg's Rice Krispies 108 3 0 254 0 2 0.1993 107.4 1.93% 1
Kellogg's Apple Jacks 109 12 0 124 0 1 0.1720 112.2 1.63% 1
Kellogg's Corn Pops 106 13 0 108 0 1 0.1734 68.9 1.78% 1
Kellogg's Cocoa Krispies 107 10 1 178 1 1 0.1545 30.9 1.10% 1
Kellogg's Raisin Bran 90 8 0 162 3 3 0.1269 0.0 3.45% 0
Kellogg's Special K Red Berries 103 9 0 199 1 3 0.2071 34.1 1.74% 0
Kellogg's Kashi GOLEAN Crunch! 106 7 0 108 4 5 0.1799 53.8 1.54% 0
Kellogg's Raisin Bran Crunch 99 11 0 110 2 2 0.1486 126.5 1.35% 0
Kellogg's Special K 106 4 0 202 1 6 0.2136 39.5 1.75% 0
Kellogg's Smart Start 102 8 0 154 2 2 0.1754 0.1 1.44% 0
Kellogg's All-Bran 73 4 0 68 8 4 0.1786 36.3 0.35% 0
General Mills Cinnamon Toast Crunch 121 9 0 196 1 1 0.1630 280.5 3.23% 1
General Mills Lucky Charms 114 11 0 190 1 2 0.1794 262.6 2.78% 1
General Mills Cocoa Puffs 112 13 0 149 1 1 0.1784 159.5 1.58% 1
General Mills Reese's Puffs 121 11 0 187 1 2 0.1746 211.5 1.13% 1
General Mills Cookie Crisp 112 12 0 159 1 1 0.2039 185.9 1.02% 1
General Mills Trix 112 12 0 158 1 1 0.1978 194.9 1.10% 1
General Mills Cheerios 103 1 0 186 3 3 0.1867 152.7 6.37% 0
General Mills Fiber One 56 0 0 98 13 2 0.2016 0.1 0.79% 0
General Mills Wheaties 103 4 0 196 3 3 0.1923 1.6 0.58% 0
Quaker Cap'n Crunch 113 12 1 209 1 1 0.1473 35.5 1.26% 1
Quaker Cap'n Crunch Crunchberries 113 13 1 196 1 1 0.1513 15.0 1.24% 1
Quaker Cap'n Crunch Peanut Butter Crunch 116 9 1 208 1 2 0.1568 14.9 0.71% 1
Quaker Life Cinnamon 104 7 0 134 2 3 0.1408 11.5 1.61% 0
Post Fruity Pebbles 112 12 0 164 0 1 0.1697 100.2 1.31% 1
Post Cocoa Pebbles 111 12 1 151 0 1 0.1678 131.5 1.14% 1
Post Honey-Comb 111 11 0 208 1 1 0.1565 184.8 1.31% 1
Post Honey Bunches of Oats 112 6 0 140 2 2 0.1508 171.3 6.07% 0
Post Grape-Nuts 101 4 0 153 2 3 0.1175 0.6 1.36% 0
Kids
Table 3.1 Descriptive Statistics of Major Cereal Products









K Special K Red Berries
K Kashi GOLEAN Crunch!














*Q Capn Crunch Crunchberries



















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Joint Store Sale Joint MFG Coupon
Two of Kellogg's Products 50,070 160
Two of General Mills Products 14,909 116
Two of Quaker Products 2,964 21
Two of Post Products 5,950 36
Two of Kids' Products 34,293 132
Two of Adult/Family's Products 13,584 105
One of Kids' and One of Adult/Family's Product 26,016 96
Note. Promotion frequencies counted based on weekly purchasing data of 32 cereal products 
from 7 DMAs and 15 major supermarket chains, 2006 to 2008. 
Table 3.3 Frequencies of Joint Promotions of Different Firms and Segments
Parameter Posterior Mean 95% Credible Intervals
Price -0.461 (-0.539,  -0.358)
Advertising Age 2-11 0.043 (-0.031,  0.124)





Note. The model was ran for 20,000 iterations with a burn-in phase of 300 
and a thinning interval of 10. Coefficients highlighted in bold are significant 
at 5% level. 7 DMAs include New York, Chicago, Detroit, Atlanta, Boston, 
Hartford, and San Francisco.














K Special K Red Berries
K Kashi GOLEAN Crunch!














*Q Capn Crunch Crunchberries




















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Description (1) (2) (3) (4)
Joint Promotion Effect
Store Sales 0.611*** 0.585*** 0.474***
(0.065) (0.062) (0.058)
MFG Coupons 0.905*** 0.581*** 0.633***
(0.171) (0.155) (0.143)
Segment Effect
Two of Kids Cereals 0.131*** 0.064***
(0.010) (0.014)
Two of Adult/Family Cereals 0.126*** 0.053***
(0.013) (0.015)
Interactions
Store Sale*Two of Kids Cereals 0.391***
(0.100)
Store Sale*Two of Adult/Family Cereals 1.007***
(0.111)
MFG Coupon*Two of Kids' Cereals 2.802***
(0.378)
MFG Coupon*Two of Adult/Family Cereals -0.200
(0.174)
Manufacturer Effect
Two of Kellogg's Cereals 0.048** 0.062*** 0.044**
(0.021) (0.019) (0.018)
Two of General Mills Cereals 0.171*** 0.173*** 0.169***
(0.024) (0.022) (0.020)
Two of Quaker Cereals 0.430*** 0.424*** 0.421***
(0.043) (0.039) (0.036)
Two of Post Cereals 0.257*** 0.268*** 0.263***
(0.036) (0.033) (0.030)
One of Kellogg's and One of General Mills -0.042** -0.035** -0.036**
(0.019) (0.018) (0.016)
One of Quaker and One of Post 0.049 0.045* 0.037
(0.030) (0.027) (0.025)
One of Kellogg's and One of Quaker 0.008 0.011 0.005
(0.022) (0.020) (0.019)
One of Kellogg's and One of Post -0.042* -0.035* -0.035**
(0.021) (0.019) (0.018)
One of General Mills and One of Quaker 0.029 0.020 0.020
(0.025) (0.023) (0.021)
Intercept -0.065*** -0.082*** -0.146*** -0.089***
(0.008) (0.017) (0.016) (0.015)
Observations 496 496 496 496
R-squared 0.236 0.409 0.517 0.593
Table 3.6 Second Stage Parameter Estimates
Note. LHS variables are posterior means of correlation coefficients from the first stage MVP model. 
All models are corrected  for heteroscedasticity using HC3 estimators. Standard errors in parentheses. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The benchmark section dummy is one of kids cereals and one of 
adult/family cereals. And the benchmark manufacturer dummy is one of General Mills products and 
one of Post products.
Scenario Description Average Change
S1 Both Joint Store Sale/MFG Coupon Increased by 20% 0.0105
S2 Both Joint Store Sale/MFG Coupon Equal to 0 -0.0525
S3 Joint Store Sale Increased by 20% 0.0095
S4 Joint MFG Coupon Increased by 20% 0.0010
Table 3.7 Simulated Correlation Changes




























































1 Treatment 2 Control
Figure 1.2 Histogram and Kernel Density Estimate of Households' Average Monthly Cereal Volume 
Purchased (hhvol, in ounces)
Figure 1.3 Quantiles of Households' Monthly Cereal Volume Purchased (in ounces)
(1)  Each Month
(2)  Average
Notes: Solid line is the quantile DID effect on volume purchased (results reported in Table 1.4); dotted lines give 
95% confidence intervals based on 200 bootstrap replications; dashed line is the mean DID effect (results reported 
in Table 1.3, Column 1).
Figure 1.4 Quantile DID Effects on the Distribution of Volume Purchased
























Figure 2.2 Front Packages of Kellogg's Rice Krispies and General Mill's Cheerios
Note. Front packages in 2006 (left), and in 2008 (right) after the implementation of Nutrition at a Glance  of Kellogg's and 
Nutrition Highlights  of General Mills.
Figure 2.3 Examples of Facts Up Front Style FOP Labels
(a) Kellogg's FOP  labels in 2006 (left) and Nutrition at a Glance in 2008 (right). 
(b) General Mills' FOP Goodness Corner logos in 2006 (left) and Nutrition Highlights in 2008 (right). 
Figure 2.4 Illustrations of Context Variables 
(a) 
(b) 
Figure 2.5 Illustrations of New Product Introduction
Fiber























Figure 3.2 Examples of Cereal Products Joint Promotions
(a) Joint Store Sales
(b) Joint Manufacturer Coupons
Note. Photo (a) shows a store sale that Kellogg's Corn Flakes, Rice Kripsies, Cocoa Krispies, Apple Jacks, Mini 
Wheats, Raisin Bran, Corn Pops, Krave, Frosted Flakes and Froot Loops are for $1.78 each (source: 
http://queenbeecoupons.com/). Photo (b) gives two examples of Kellogg's manufacturer coupons, both are valid 
when two packages are purchased together (source: http://www.smartcouponing.com/).




































































































































































































































































Figure 3.5 Estimated Bivariate Correlations Heat Map from MVP Model
Figure 3.6 Simulated Correlation Heat Map
S1: Both Joint Store Sale/MFG Coupon Increased by 20%
S2: Both Joint Store Sale/MFG Coupon Equal to 0
